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ABSTRACT 
Research surrounding how much influence the public has on the U.S. Supreme Court 
offers conflicting results. Some scholars argue that because the Court is politically insulated it 
does not pay much attention to what the public desires when deciding cases. Others suggest the 
Court’s decisions reflect prevailing public moods. I join in this debate and argue that public 
opinion indirectly influences the Court by motivating key actors to support cases and file briefs, 
thereby helping shape the Court’s agenda. When powerful attorneys such as the Solicitor General 
or large D.C. law firms are involved in a petition for certiorari, there is a higher likelihood that 
these petitions will be granted certiorari. In addition, I argue public attention spurs action among 
special interest groups in the form of Amicus curiae briefs and gets the attention of powerful 
lawyers and government appointees. Once again, these actions increase the likelihood of a case 
being heard on the merits. I use data from social media to determine how much specific issue 
areas are being talked about among the American public and build models showing how 
increased attention leads to discernible effects on the certiorari process at the U.S. Supreme 
Court. I find that the public, albeit indirectly, does have an impact on what petitions are given 
more attention by the U.S. Supreme Court. Many have argued that the Court is immune from 
public pressure, and these findings give evidence against that argument.  
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction 
In January 2010, the Supreme Court made a landmark 5-4 decision in Citizens United v. 
FEC where the Court lifted restrictions on campaign contributions for corporations and other 
organizations.1 In November of the same year, the Court accepted a petition for a writ of 
certiorari to another campaign finance case, Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC 
v. Bennett.2 In 1998, the Arizona legislature passed a law which gave a flat amount of funding to 
candidates running for statewide. The act sets spending limits for participating candidates and 
provides them with additional funds if a nonparticipating opponent spends more than the limit 
for the office. The act also reduces contribution limits for individuals by 20% to nonparticipating 
candidates. Candidates could opt in or out, however, if they opted out, the law stipulated that if 
their opponents opted in, the opponent would receive matching funds based on the amounts spent 
by private opponents and independent groups against them. Meaning, if one campaign opted out 
and an outside group raised and spent more money, their challengers would get an equal amount 
in return from the state. In 2008, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, along with Republican 
candidates sued the state. The plaintiffs argued that the law limited the amount of money they 
could spend on their own campaigns as well as against their opponents, which constituted a 
violation of their free speech. The U.S. District Court agreed with the plaintiffs and found the 
1998 Arizona statute unconstitutional. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
the district court, finding that the law had a minimal impact on free speech.  
                                                 
1 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
2 Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011) 
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 On August 17th, 2010, the original plaintiffs of the Arizona case petitioned the U.S. 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, hoping the high court would reverse the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision. Likely due to the Court’s decision in Citizens United earlier in the year, public attention 
toward campaign finance spiked around the same time.3 Interestingly, the Arizona petition 
received five amicus curiae briefs (highly influential and expensive documents) before the Court 
made its decision to grant certiorari. In contrast, the much more widely known Citizens United 
petition received just one amici brief. After the Court granted the Arizona petition and placed it 
on the upcoming docket, the U.S. Solicitor General and many other interest groups also took 
interest in the case. The Solicitor General filed a motion to argue on the side of the respondents 
to uphold the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, and this motion was granted. In addition, after certiorari 
was granted, the petition would receive 38 additional amicus briefs before a final decision was 
made. In the end, the Court ruled 5-4 for the petitioners and reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.  
Why did the Arizona petition garner such strong attention from interest groups and 
government attorneys before the Court placed the petition on its agenda? Why would interest 
groups spend hundreds of thousands of dollars preparing amicus curiae briefs for a relatively less 
important case when they did not for the much more important Citizens United petition filed less 
than a year earlier? I argue that an increase in public attention to an issue area can motivate 
important actors who influence the Supreme Court to change their behavior. The more the public 
pays attention to an issue area, the more likely interest groups who deal with that issue are going 
to become active to show their membership that they are attempting to influence policy. In 
addition, I argue the more attention an issue receives, the more likely government attorneys are 
                                                 
3 The spike of public attention toward Campaign Finance, how I measure it, and how the data was collected, is 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
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to get involved in or directly litigate cases related to the issue to show constituents that they are 
working on issues the public cares about.  
Understanding why certain petitions are granted certiorari and others are not is of great 
importance. Justices’ rulings establish new precedent, and through these decisions the Supreme 
Court makes policy. The earliest stage of establishing a new precedent is when the justices 
decide which cases the Supreme Court will decide on the merits. Understanding what factors 
impact the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari is important because of the clear link 
between this agenda-setting function of the Court and the ultimate decisions of the Court. By 
deciding which cases to hear – and which not to hear – the Court crafts its policy agenda. These 
decisions carry with them great weight: placing an issue on the Court’s agenda, or leaving it off, 
can have important ramifications in both the legal and political arenas.  
Petitions granted certiorari have changed the social and legal landscape of America 
multiple times in dramatic ways. In the last 60 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down 
racial segregation in schools, protected the free press, allowed criminal defendants the right to an 
attorney, removed barriers for mixed race couples to marry, confirmed the right of women to 
control pregnancies, determined limits of executive privilege, decided presidential elections, and 
extended marriage rights to same-sex couples.4 These landmark cases are a small selection of 
some of the more famous decisions, however, each term includes important and transformative 
decisions that are made by the Court. Because the Supreme Court has discretion over their 
agenda, these petitions did not have to be granted certiorari, but they were. Why? At some point 
during the agenda setting process, something stood out to the justices which helped convince 
                                                 
4 In order: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973), United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 14-556 (2015). 
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them to grant certiorari to these specific petitions over thousands of others. I argue that there has 
been an overlooked variable in researching what impacts the likelihood of a petition being 
granted certiorari: public attention. If the Court has an understudied lever that is used to 
determine their agenda setting requirements, it stands that greater understanding of that lever 
would allow a more complete view of the Court’s actions and priorities. This not only adds to the 
academic understanding of American governmental systems but stands to lay the groundwork for 
predictive models using new data and technologies as they are invented. Understanding new 
influences and predicting the outcome of that influence with confidence helps maintain 
transparency in our democracy and reinforces public trust.    
This project investigates a new angle on Supreme Court agenda setting and uses a novel 
measure to determine what impact public attention to specific issue areas has on the agenda 
setting process. I argue and find that as public attention to an issue area increases, it can prompt 
legal important players to take specific actions which ultimately affect what is on the Supreme 
Court’s agenda. I argue, therefore, that there is an indirect impact of public attention on the 
Court’s agenda via these outside actors.  
While a relatively small, yet rich, literature addresses the cert process, understanding how 
the public impacts this process is largely unexplored. There are many different aspects of an 
appeal that have been shown to change the probability that the Supreme Court will grant 
certiorari. The type of appeal (criminal, civil liberties/rights, taxes, etc.), how many amicus 
briefs are submitted, what considerations the judges may be making, and the types of lawyers 
and litigants all impact agenda setting on the Court. However, the public is conspicuously 
missing from the list of known impacts on Supreme Court agenda setting. This project thus 
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explores how the public can impact the agenda of an institution known for being insulated from 
public opinion and contributes to the agenda-setting literature in several ways.   
First, with how public attention impacts an important Court document: amicus curiae 
briefs. Amici brief filing can occur during both the certiorari and merits stages, usually with 
different goals in mind for the filers. When one files an amicus brief at the certiorari stage, they 
are generally informing the Court of why they believe the petition should be denied or granted. 
Briefs filed during the merits stage are giving the Court information about their preferred 
outcome on a case and what potential ramifications may be if the Court decides one way or 
another. Generally, the more amicus briefs the Court receives for a petition, the more likely they 
are to grant certiorari (Caldeira and Wright 1988, 1990; Perry 1991; Baum and Neal 2009). 
Further, there is evidence that the arguments found within amicus briefs end up in final Court 
decisions (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997; Kearney and Merill 2000; Corley 2008). Thus, it is 
important to understand what influences outside actors to file amicus briefs, and this project 
contributes by adding public attention to the list of potential influences. The first empirical 
chapter explores the connection between amicus briefs and public opinion.  
This project also contributes to our understanding of what prompts powerful attorneys to 
act and how the public impacts these actions. Many have explored what impact attorneys like the 
U.S. Solicitor General (S.G.) have on both the agenda and final decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Past research has noted how dramatic the impact is when the S.G. or other government 
attorneys get involved in a petition. When the S.G. petitions the Court for certiorari, or when the 
S.G. informs the Court of their preference on how a case should be decided, the Court goes with 
the S.G. recommendation a majority of the (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Provine 1980; Ulmer 1984; 
Caldeira and Wright 1988; McGuire 1998; Owens 2010). However, relatively few have 
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investigated why the S.G. takes action in the first place. This project explores more deeply the 
motivation of the country’s most powerful attorney, along with his or her colleagues, in why they 
take action. When public attention increases, the likelihood powerful attorneys will petition the 
Court or write powerful documents, such as an Amicus curiae brief, also increases. This question 
and ultimate findings are important because little research has explained why they choose to join 
the cases they choose to join. Further, there is an assumption in the agenda-setting literature that 
suggests petitions with powerful lawyers appear in front of the justices without much exploration 
of why they received this attention. This contribution begins the exploration of asking why 
powerful attorneys attach themselves to some cases and not others, impacting which petitions are 
ultimately granted cert. 
The next contribution brings both S.G. involvement and amicus briefs together with 
public attention to examine how much attention the Court gives each petition before deciding its 
fate. I use time spent deliberating each petition as a variable to quantify how much attention the 
Court gives each petition. I find that in general, the more attention (time spent) the Court gives a 
petition, the higher the likelihood they will grant certiorari. I use a two-stage model to show that 
as public attention increases, both amicus briefs and government attorney involvement also 
increase, which then leads to more attention paid by the justices. Thus, there is an indirect impact 
of public attention on the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court. Understanding why some petitions 
receive more attention from the Court is important to more fully understand the agenda setting 
process. Deeper knowledge of how this process works allows us to better predict which petitions 
will be granted certiorari, and for those looking to change policy, allows for better strategies to 
get a petition granted.   
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The final contribution of this research is to help bring light to a new way to measure 
public engagement to specific issue areas, giving researchers insight that was once not possible. 
Previous work relied on surveys or newspapers to get an idea of what might be important to the 
public. Today, advancements in technology and changes in how we communicate have allowed 
for new ways of measurement. Using data from what the public says online, we can get an idea 
of what the public cares about at any given moment. As we watch public attention rise and fall, 
we can determine how it impacts any number of political players and, for this project in 
particular, how it impacts the Supreme Court. Data gathered in this manner is live, dynamic, and 
constantly updating, which makes for some fascinating areas of research that can now be 
explored. As the public can exert more pressure on the Court and that pressure becomes more 
immediate, unfiltered, and voluminous with technology, we have an imperative to understand 
how political institutions will respond. Social media potentially gives the keys to the car to that 
of the public and takes away the agenda setting influences of political elites, or at least begins to 
equalize the process and priority of the topics considered critical for consideration in a new way. 
1.2 Theoretical Overview 
The discretionary nature of the Supreme Court’s agenda opens the door to investigate 
what prompts certain petitions to get attention over others. The Supreme Court is insulated from 
the shifting landscape of public opinion, yet, there is considerable debate regarding how much 
the Court responds to public preferences. In examining decisions at the merits stage, studies 
reveal mixed findings as to how much influence the public has on the Supreme Court. Some 
scholars show evidence of public opinion and elites constraining the justices’ decision making 
(Mishler and Sheehan 1993; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Clark 2009; Casillas, Enns, and 
Wohlfarth 2011), while others cast doubt on this proposition (Norpoth and Segal 1994; Segal and 
8 
Spaeth 2002; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). While a wealth of research is devoted to 
what influences the Court’s decision making on the merits, there is less research regarding how 
the public may influence the Court at the beginning, or the certiorari stage, of the process. 
Scholars have identified many different aspects of an appeal that increase the probability 
that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari. Civil liberties petitions are more likely to be granted 
cert than other issues (Caldeira and Wright 1988).  The number of amicus briefs holds influence 
as well: petitions accompanied by more amici briefs are more likely to be granted cert. Lower 
courts that are more ideologically distant from the Supreme Court are more likely to have their 
cases reviewed (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer, Hintze, and Kirklosky 1972; Caldeira and Wright 
1988; Collins 2004). In addition, when certain lawyers and litigants are part of a case or submit a 
brief, such as the Solicitor General (S.G.) or powerful organizations, there is a dramatic increase 
in the likelihood of certiorari being granted (Nicholson and Collins 2008; Wohlfarth 2009). 
Finally, studies demonstrate that salient petitions increase the likelihood of special interest 
groups and government officials filing amicus curiae briefs (Solowiej and Collins 2009; Zuber, 
Sommer, and Parent 2015).  
However, no studies to date focus on how amici choose which petitions to join, nor 
explore how public attention may influence this process. Increasing our understanding of what 
factors encourage (or discourage) amici briefs is important due to their strong impact on the 
certiorari process. Studies routinely find that the presence of amici briefs increases the 
likelihood the Court will grant certiorari, underscoring why we need to understand what types of 
petitions are most likely to secure amici (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Collins 2004). 
I argue public attention indirectly influences the agenda-setting process of the unelected 
court sitting at the apex of the American judiciary. However, the unelected nature of the justices 
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means that this influence is a reflection of the actions taken by other actors in response to public 
opinion. I argue powerful litigants, such as solicitors general, attorneys general, private repeat 
players, and interest groups are similarly more likely to submit an amici brief, and more likely to 
appeal their case to the U.S. Supreme Court when the case in question relates to issues of high 
public salience. When public attention towards an issue area increases, several changes in 
behavior occur among those surrounding the Supreme Court. More public attention applies 
pressure to elected government attorneys to address the issue and interest groups wish to show 
their members they are active in policy and file more amicus briefs. Public attention thus 
influences powerful actors to engage a problem they may not have otherwise.  
I test this theory by estimating the impact public attention has on the likelihood of amicus 
briefs being filed, government attorneys petitioning the Court, interest group activity, and 
influential private attorneys. The following section outlines how this dissertation will proceed, 
chapter by chapter, in giving evidence to support my argument.  
1.3 Chapter Outlines 
Chapter 2 fully explicates my theory as to why these outside actors would care if the 
public suddenly gives more attention to an issue area.  
Chapter 3 then discusses my measure of public attention and how it was created; this 
chapter also provides measurement validity checks. The inability to measure what is salient to 
the public on an array of issues contributes to a dearth of research on how the public influences 
the certiorari process, especially during debate. For the most part, existing measures of salience 
capture information reflecting the state of the world after certiorari has been granted. This 
project aims to bridge that gap and offers a more direct and accurate measure of what the 
prevailing topics in public discourse at any given point.  
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The next three chapters empirically test my theory. Chapter 4 analyzes the impact public 
attention has on amicus curiae filings. I argue that when public interest in a given issue area is 
high, interest groups and others seeking to capitalize on this public interest are more likely to file 
amici briefs. Special interest groups desire to show their members they are actively working on 
their issue of interest and filing amici briefs on related cases is a strong signal of such activity. 
But what increases the likelihood of an interest group filing a brief on a particular petition? I 
hypothesize that groups are more likely to take action when public attention to an issue is high, 
allowing them to capitalize on this increased salience. I first confirm previous findings that 
petitions receiving more amicus briefs are more likely to be granted cert. I then show that 
petitions receive more amicus briefs when public attention to the relevant topic area increases.   
Chapter 5 explains why and then empirically assesses how public attention impacts the 
likelihood of interest groups, government attorneys, and private actors to petition the U.S. 
Supreme Court or file amicus briefs. In this chapter, I argue powerful litigants, such as solicitors 
general, attorneys general, private repeat players, and interest groups are similarly more likely to 
submit an amicus brief and more likely to appeal their case to the U.S. Supreme Court when the 
case in question relates to issues of high public salience. The results of this chapter indicate that 
for government attorneys and private repeat players, an increase in public attention to an issue 
area significantly increases the probability they will petition the U.S. Supreme Court for 
certiorari. Further, this chapter finds that when an AG/SG is not party to a petition, they are 
more likely to file an amicus brief if there is more public attention on the issue at hand. In 
addition, government attorneys and interest groups are more likely to file amicus briefs before a 
certiorari decision is made when public attention increases. Thus, the public has a demonstrable 
impact on important actors outside of the U.S. Supreme Court. Outside actors such as interest 
11 
groups or elected attorneys have an interest in tackling issues the public cares about, and this 
chapter shows an effect of public attention.  
Chapter 6 more directly tests the potential relationship between public attention, the 
actions of outside groups, and the Supreme Court’s certiorari decisions. Chapters 4 and 5 reveal 
that public attention significantly influences the calculations of important outside actors in the 
certiorari process. I argue that the actions of these key actors in turn influence the degree of 
attention the Supreme Court devotes to evaluating these petitions. Caldeira and Wright (1990) 
use the docket books from Justice Brennan to examine what aspects of petitions increase the 
likelihood the Court will place them on the discuss list. Variables such as U.S. being a party, 
lower court conflict, issue area (Civil Liberties), ideology, and amicus curiae participation are 
tested. The authors find that the U.S. Solicitor General manages to land over 90% of the cases 
they are a part of placed on the discuss list, and more amicus briefs further increase the 
likelihood of placement on the list. This chapter explores whether public attention to an issue 
area indirectly influences how much time the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court spend 
deliberating a petition.  
After demonstrating the positive impact days discussed has on the likelihood of certiorari 
being granted, I then model what impacts a petition to garner more attention from the Court. 
Utilizing a two-stage model, I find that public attention has a positive and significant impact on 
the number of amicus briefs filed in relation to a petition before certiorari, and those briefs then 
positively impact the amount of attention the Court devotes to the petition. Further, the more 
public attention an issue area receives, the more likely a powerful litigant is going to petition the 
Supreme Court to hear a case related to the issue area, and, subsequently, the more likely the 
Court will give increased scrutiny to the petition in question. The analysis in this chapter thus 
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demonstrate that public attention indirectly influences which cases ultimately end up on the 
Supreme Court’s docket. 
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and gives an overview of the findings, a discussion 
of broader implications, what some limitations may be, and where future research can build upon 
this study. Overall the findings of this dissertation are straightforward: the public, through other 
actors, has a demonstrable influence on the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court. As past research 
has demonstrated, it is important to further our understanding of what elements of a petition 
increase the likelihood of certiorari being granted. However, it is also important to understand 
how and why outside actors become involved on a petition, and what influences their decisions 
to do so. My argument and findings show that at least some of their decision-making calculus 
includes what the public pays attention to.  
Further, I argue for more innovative uses of data from social media as a way to gauge 
what the public is talking about, what the valence of that conversation is, and how it can be 
applied in other areas of political science. In addition, this dissertation has made extensive use of 
JavaScript and Python to gather large quantities of data in a relatively short amount of time, and I 
argue scholars need to familiarize themselves with these tools to expand what areas are possible 
to research.  
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2 CHAPTER 2: A THEORY OF PUBLIC ATTENTION & CERTIORARI 
The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and 
pass the judges by.  
-Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo 1921, 168 
2.1 Introduction 
The Supreme Court is, in many ways, structurally insulated from the shifting landscape 
of public opinion, yet there is considerable debate regarding how much the Court responds to 
public preferences. In examining decisions at the merits stage, there are mixed results on how 
much influence the public has on the Supreme Court. The court on one hand appears to follow 
along with what the general public mood or opinion is on a given issue (Mishler and Sheehan 
1993; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Clark 2009; Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011), and on the 
other hand, the Court seems to be immune from public opinion (Norpoth and Segal 1994; Segal 
and Spaeth 2002; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). Much research has been dedicated to 
deciphering what influences the Court’s decision making on the merits, however, less is known 
regarding how the public may influence the Court at the certiorari stage. 
When the public is particularly attentive to an issue area, the complexion of petitions to 
the U.S. Supreme Court may change. Interest groups eager to please their members seize on 
public interest to file amici briefs and government officials take a policy stand. While the Court 
is mostly insulated from public backlash, a multitude of constraints and pressures do exist. For 
its decisions to be carried out, often the other branches need to be involved. If the public 
disapproves of the Court, the incentive for the executive and Congress to carry out its decisions 
might wane. The public, then, may have more of an impact on the Court than currently 
understood. 
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Knowing more about how the agenda is set at the Supreme Court furthers our 
understanding of how this institution operates and why some petitions and policies are decided 
over the others. The policy-making power of this institution makes understanding how and why 
public opinion matters in the agenda-setting process important. 
This project asks whether the public indirectly influences the Supreme Court’s agenda-
setting behavior. I posit public interest in an issue may spur other actors known to influence the 
Court into action. When there is high public interest in an issue, powerful litigants such as the 
Solicitor General or state Attorneys General may be encouraged to write a brief arguing for the 
Court to accept a petition dealing with the issue. In addition, interest groups seeking to capitalize 
on public interest and demonstrate their actions to their members may be more likely to file 
amici briefs. As such actions – such as the SG being a party to a case or interest groups filing 
amicus briefs – increase the likelihood of the Court granting cert, public attention on an issue 
area may exert an indirect impact on the petitions the Supreme Court agrees to hear. 
What I do not argue is for any direct connection between public attention and certiorari 
decisions. Instead, I argue past research has overlooked the impact the public has on those actors 
we know are influential in the Court’s agenda setting process. Certain attorneys and interest 
groups have an outsized influence on the Court’s certiorari decisions. I argue those interest 
groups and attorneys are influenced by public attention and they, in turn, sway the Court’s 
agenda via the actions they take.  
This chapter summarizes my theory and begins by outlining the current literature on the 
decision to grant or deny certiorari. I then explicate my theory of the indirect influence public 
attention has on the Court’s certiorari process through its influence on certain key actors in the 
legal process. I further discuss my specific expectations for how public attention influences the 
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actions of interest groups and governmental actors, and the effect of their actions on which 
petitions the Court devotes the most attention.  
2.2 Writs of Certiorari 
In the judicial branch, litigants can appeal a lower court’s decision to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court, however, chooses which cases it will hear; this power is known as 
discretionary jurisdiction. Losing parties may therefore file a petition for writ of certiorari 
requesting that the Court review their case. These petitions are then reviewed by the Supreme 
Court, and a small fraction are granted a Writ of Certiorari. Roughly 7,000 to 8,000 petitions are 
filed each term seeking attention from the Court, and about 1% are granted review.5 When a 
petition is granted certiorari, it means that the Court has agreed to hear the case in full and 
formally added it to its agenda. Thus, a crucial question arises with how the Court determines 
which few petitions it will accord a full hearing. 
Rule 10 of the Supreme Court provides some guidance as to the types of cases the Court 
favors for granting a writ of certiorari; these include cases with legal conflicts between lower 
courts, or cases where the lower court “has decided an important federal question in a way that 
conflicts with relevant decisions of the Supreme Court.”6 A primary motivation of the Court thus 
is to maintain a uniform body of law throughout the country. However, conflicts among lower 
courts is not the only metric the justices use when deciding to grant certiorari. Not every case 
appealed to the Supreme Court has equal merit, and many are often found frivolous. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan have commented that many of the petitions are “patently 
                                                 
5 Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1990. "The discuss list: Agenda building in the Supreme Court." Law 
and Society Review: 807-836. 
6 Rules of the Supreme Court no. 10: Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari 
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without merit” and do not require discussion; it is the Court’s job to only devote time to cases of 
real need (McKay 1979; Perry 1991; O’Brien 2008). 
A key part of weeding out cases depends on certain aspects of the petition itself. Early 
work on this topic put forward cue theory, which argues that elements of some petitions stand 
out from others and the justices then take these cues under consideration during the certiorari 
review process. Cue theory suggests that justices pay attention to the reputation of the attorneys, 
the reputation of the lower court judge or circuit, case type (e.g. civil liberties/rights versus tax 
law), and the parties to the case (e.g. federal government) (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer, Hintze, 
and Kirklosky 1972). More recently, scholars have noted that ideology also matters: for instance, 
a conservative Supreme Court is more likely to accept cases from a liberal circuit than one from 
a conservative circuit, and vice versa (Caldeira and Wright 1988; O’Brien 2008).  
Strategic and interpersonal calculations also play a role in the certiorari process. A 
justice may be hesitant to grant certiorari if he/she feels the Court as a whole would not back 
his/her preferred policy in ruling on the merits of a case—known as a “defensive denial” of 
certiorari. When a petition comes up for review, a strategic justice who wants to move a policy 
closer to his/her preferred position will be more likely to grant certiorari if he/she feels there will 
be a majority of justices that support that position (Perry 1991; Boucher and Segal 1995; Segal 
1997; Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999).  
Scholars have identified many different aspects of an appeal that change the probability 
of the Supreme Court granting certiorari. The type of appeal matters; civil liberties’ petitions 
will generally fare better at getting certiorari granted than other issues, more amici briefs 
increase the likelihood of certiorari, as does the ideological distance between the Supreme Court 
and the lower courts (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer, Hintze, and Kirklosky 1972; Caldeira and 
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Wright 1988; Collins 2004). In addition, certain lawyers and litigants being part of a case or 
submitting a brief, such as the Solicitor General (S.G.) or powerful organizations, also increase 
the likelihood of certiorari being granted (Nicholson and Collins 2008; Wohlfarth 2009).  
I argue that some of the impetus of outside actors attempting to influence the Supreme 
Court is partially dependent on how much attention that issue has recently received from the 
public. Interest groups want to show their engagement in a policy, and I argue they are more 
likely to file an amicus brief when an issue, in their purview, has sufficient attention from the 
public. Elected officials in both the state and the federal government have a keen interest in 
tackling issues their constituents are concerned about, which I posit increases their likelihood of 
formally joining a petition or filing an amicus brief. Also, agents of elected officials, including 
the S.G. and state Attorney Generals are motivated to act when an issue becomes salient to the 
public. This response from key actors then encourages the Court to grant certiorari to petitions in 
the salient issue areas. Thus, the public indirectly influences the Supreme Court by placing 
incentives and pressure on outside actors.  
2.3 Amicus curiae  
Amicus curiae briefs also provide strong cues for the Supreme Court. Amici briefs are 
filed by individuals or entities who are not formally a part of the case.7 Amici briefs can be 
submitted both at the certiorari or the merits stage.8 These briefs can serve as a cue for justices 
with regards to what people ideologically similar/distant believe, if other institutions prefer one 
outcome or cert to be/not be granted, and/or if the legal community has an opinion on certiorari.  
                                                 
7 Rules of the Supreme Court no. 37: Brief for an Amicus curiae 
8 After a petition has been granted, new amici briefs are submitted to persuade the justices to rule one way or 
another 
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Amici briefs are effective, particularly at the certiorari stage. Generally, as the number of 
amicus briefs increase (either for or against the petitioner), there is a higher likelihood that the 
Supreme Court will hear the case (Caldeira and Wright 1988, 1990; Perry 1991; Baum and Neal 
2009). In fact, nearly all cases accepted by the Supreme Court have amici briefs filed (Epstein 
and Knight 1999; Kearney and Merrill 2000). There has been an increase in the number of 
amicus briefs being filed over time, particularly from special interests and large organizations 
(Epstein and Knight 1998; Collins 2004). Interestingly, the legal arguments contained within the 
briefs filed at the merits stage of the process often make their way into the final opinion as well, 
indicating that they are informative to the justices and can have an impact on the eventual 
precedent set (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997; Kearney and Merrill 2000; Corley 2008). In 
addition, this effect is similar for amicus briefs filed in the circuit courts of appeal (Martinek 
2006).  
While expensive, many interest groups find filing an amicus brief to be money well 
spent. Members of special interest organizations want their organizations to influence a policy 
change, and these briefs are tangible evidence of such attempts (Solowiej and Collins 2009). 
Amicus briefs signal to the members of an interest group that the organization is acting and 
attempting to influence a policy (Wasby 1995; Collins and Martinek 2010; Zuber, Sommer, and 
Parent 2015). Using amicus briefs as a vehicle, interest groups can inform the justices of the 
harm or benefits of granting certiorari (at the cert stage) or what repercussions may occur at the 
merits, or decision stage (Collins 2004, 2008).  
Some argue that amici participation itself is a proxy for public attention or public salience 
on a given case. With no direct way to capture salience on a specific case or issue area, scholars 
argue that increased amici participation signals more public or legal interest. And, studies find 
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that the Court pays more attention to certiorari petitions with high levels of amici participation 
(Hansford and Damore 2000; Maltzman and Wahlbeck 1996; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 
2000; Collins 2004). Thus, attention paid by the public suggests a connection between public 
salience and an increase in the likelihood of granted to salient petitions. However, scholars have 
not yet explored what induces outside amici to join these particular petitions. Put another way, 
why do some petitions become salient? 
I argue that because special interest groups and elected members of government 
(including state governments) have an interest in affecting policy, an increase in public attention 
to an issue area may induce these groups / government bodies to file more amici briefs for 
showing their involvement. Thus, increased attention from the public is likely to produce more 
amicus briefs related to a salient issue area, which in turn makes it more likely that the Supreme 
Court will accept petitions related to that issue. Most scholars examine which cases receive 
amicus briefs, as opposed to why the amici were filed in the first place. Understanding why 
amicus briefs are filed in the first place, however, is necessary to fully understand what impact 
they have later.  
In the 2014 – 2015 Supreme Court term, there were a record number of amicus briefs 
filed during both the cert and merits stages;9 a record-breaking 147 amici were filed for one 
case—the gay marriage case—Obergefell v. Hodges, an extremely salient issue area.10 In other 
recent terms, 136 amici were filed in the cases surrounding the Obamacare decision, 156 split 
between two other gay marriage cases Perry11 and Windsor12, and 47 filed for the recent Texas 
                                                 
9 The National Law Journal, August 19, 2015.  
10 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. (2015) 
11 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. (2013) 
12 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. (2013) 
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abortion case, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.13 These cases are easy to identify as ones 
in which there was intense public interest even before the Court granted certiorari, which I argue 
is a component as to why there were so many amicus briefs filed.  
Interest groups are the major players in issuing these briefs as it helps to show their 
members that they are actively attempting to change policy (Wasby 1995; Hansford 2004; 
Collins 2004, 2008; Solowiej and Collins 2009; Collins and Martinek 2010; Zuber, Sommer, and 
Parent 2015). I argue the more salient the issue area, the more likely it is that interest groups, 
lobbying firms, and others will file an amicus brief on a case addressing that issue in order to 
satiate their members. Thus, increased public salience indirectly influences the Court by inducing 
more amici briefs on salient issue petitions versus non-salient ones, which in turn raises the 
likelihood of these (salient issue) petitions being granted cert. 
2.4 Lawyers and Litigants  
Certain actors have an outsized influence on the Court, and their motivation for acting 
may be influenced by public attention to specific issue areas. The Solicitor General may be the 
most important outside actor. The strength of the S.G. is quite evident; for instance, when the 
S.G. submits an amicus brief or recommends the Court hear a case, the Court is much more 
likely to accept that case for review (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Provine 1980; Ulmer 1984; Caldeira 
and Wright 1988; McGuire 1998; Owens 2010). Once the Solicitor General has made the 
government’s position clear, the Court sides with the government, majority of the times. When 
the Court and executive branch are ideologically aligned, the S.G. wins 87% of the time, whereas 
that number is still as high as 60% if the President and Court are not ideologically aligned 
(Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005; Wolfarth 2009). The president and S.G. may see high 
                                                 
13 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. (2016) 
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public attention surrounding an issue area which encourages action by the executive branch. 
Action could include filing an amicus brief stating their position to affect the policy and appease 
their supporters. The S.G. will not always be told explicitly by the executive to file a brief in a 
case, but in general, her actions can be viewed as a proxy for what the executive branch prefers 
(Johnson 2003; Nicholson and Collins 2008; Owens 2010).  
This deference to the executive via the S.G. suggests the justices are strategic and do not 
simply execute their own policy desires, but also consider other actors. When a case is politically 
salient, the ideology of the individual justices wins out over arguments or positions of other 
branches of the government (McAtee and McGuire 2007). On the merits, non-salient cases 
appear to leave the justices open to persuasion from other branches or amici briefs, whereas 
salient cases rouse the justices, inducing a more ideological behavior (McAtee and McGuire 
2007; Black and Owens 2012; Fix 2014). An exact reasoning as to why this is the case is not 
clear, however, some have speculated that the Justices feel the need to be more ideological in 
their decision-making when the issue is salient to the public (Segal and Spaeth 2002).  
Scholars argue that the S.G. will be more likely to file a brief or become more active in 
litigation if the case/issue is important to the public (Puro 1971; Salokar 1992). In recent work, 
Nicholson and Collins (2008) seek to identify when the S.G., arguably the most powerful actor 
outside of the justices themselves (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Pacelle 2003; Bailey, Kamoie, and 
Maltzman 2005), would be prompted to file an amicus curiae brief. The authors find that when 
certain legal, political, or administrative conditions are present, the S.G. is more likely to do so. 
Specifically, they find that when cases are salient, as measured via the NYT salience measure, 
the S.G. is 15% more likely to file a brief (Nicholson and Collins 2008). Thus, if an issue is 
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important to the public, it is more likely that the S.G. will become involved, thus increasing the 
likelihood of certiorari being granted  
While no other individual lawyer is in front of the Court as often as the S.G., research 
shows that other high powered, connected, or elite lawyers can also affect the Supreme Court’s 
agenda-setting (McGuire and Caldeira 1993). Litigants with more financial resources are more 
likely to have their petition granted by the Court and receive a favorable decision on the merits 
(Galanter 1974; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 1999). For instance, this “hierarchy of litigants,” 
where some litigants perform at higher rates, illustrates that government entities win more often 
than businesses, which win more often than interest groups, who win and get their cases granted 
certiorari more so than individuals (Owen 1971; Galanter 1974; Wanner 1975). Across all 
federal courts, government entities are four times more likely than individuals, and twice as 
likely than businesses, to have their cases heard and won (Songer and Sheehan 1992). Further, 
among the individual litigants, those who are well financed and employ lawyers who are repeat 
players in front of the Supreme Court are the most likely to have their petitions granted (Feldman 
and Kappner 2016). In all, those with the most resources are able to direct the agenda and have a 
strong influence on the eventual outcomes of the Court’s decisions.  
Research also suggests that litigants themselves are strategic. The decision to appeal a 
judgment comes down primarily to economics; litigants must determine if their perceived payoff 
will be greater than the costs incurred by mounting an appeal to a higher court (Priest and Klein 
1984; Kessler, Meites, and Miller 1996). A part of the calculation for litigants is the ideological 
makeup of the court the case will be appealed to. There is ample evidence of ideologically 
strategic litigants. For instance, when deciding to appeal a case, litigants take the ideological 
temperature of the higher court and use that to determine their eventual success (Zorn 2002; 
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Baird 2007; Yates and Coggins 2009; Giles, Walker, and Zorn 2006; Black and Owens 2009; 
Mak, Sidman, and Sommer 2013). I argue that litigants take notice when an issue becomes 
salient to the public and alter their planning. If the public is generally on their side, they will 
push forward and file a petition. Further, other actors besides parties on the petition take notice, 
adding another layer of the public’s influence.  
In addition to the S.G., an under-explored area of research is if the state Attorneys 
General or other elite lawyers will seek out or attach themselves to a case in an issue area that is 
salient among the public. For A.G.s and executive branches of state, getting involved with cases 
that the wider public is concerned with makes intuitive sense. State executive branches and 
A.G.s have policy goals, and litigation is the means of pursuing those goals. The State Attorneys 
General will likely not be compelled to issue a brief or join a case that is nationally salient, 
unless it is also salient within their state as they too are motivated by policy and electoral goals. 
Major law firms or elite lawyers who sense an increase in salience for an issue area, or the public 
opening a window, may more likely represent petitions relating to that issue if it aligns with their 
clients or lobbying goals. The culmination of these various actors’ changing behavior due to 
public salience can indirectly impact how the Court sets their agenda. In short, if an issue is 
highly salient to the public in a handful of states, it is likely the A.G.s of those states will join 
cases or file briefs related to those issue areas, which in turn will increase the likelihood of 
certiorari being granted.  
Finally, interest group behavior in the Courts is worth attention due to the large role they 
play in American politics. Generally, interest groups influence representatives with campaign 
contributions or by mobilizing their large base of support in the public (Bentley 1908). Interest 
groups need to push for specific policy goals to show supporters they are active in the issues’ 
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arena and maintain membership (Walker 1983; Collins 2004; Cigler, Loomis, and Nownes 
2015). Walker (1983) examines the creation and continued maintenance of interest groups in the 
20th century. Walker finds that interest groups who accomplish their goal with no new agenda 
tend to disappear, and those who maintain strong allegiances with the public, especially in terms 
of monetary donations, thrive. While most interest groups in Walker’s period of study were 
founded by a wealthy patron, without continued public support, the interest group loses clout in 
achieving policy goals. 
2.5 Discuss List 
Before the writs of certiorari are decided, some petitions—a short list of petitions the 
Justices feel are worth the extra attention—are placed on the Discuss List. The Court eventually 
creates its agenda from the discuss list for the upcoming term, with approximately 7% to 9% of 
petitions making it to the list. The factors currently known to impact the likelihood of petitions 
being placed on the discuss list include amicus briefs, S.G. involvement, and the ideological 
distance between the lower court and the Supreme Court (Caldeira and Wright 1990). However, I 
argue that there exists another influence on the discuss list—public attention to the petition’s 
issue area. Others have argued similarly, essentially that the justices and clerks are all a part of 
the society and likely know if an issue is particularly salient when they are reviewing petitions 
(Giles, Blackstone, and Vining 2008; Baum 2009; Fix 2014).  
Understanding which factors influence the decision of placing a petition on the discuss 
list and granting of certiorari is important because of the clear link between the agenda-setting 
function of the Court and their ultimate decisions. Thus, when controlling for other known 
influences on the discuss list, I argue that high public salience to an issue will exert its own effect 
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via the actions of outside actors. These outside actors take notice of the public’s attention and file 
amicus briefs or petitions to the Court in situations they might not have otherwise.  
In the Judiciary, there are two ways in which the Court can give attention to an issue; the 
discuss list and granting of certiorari. Litigants need to persuade the Court to give their petition 
attention, and the first hurdle they need to overcome is making it to the discuss list. The discuss 
list has origins in the mid-1900s after the Supreme Court was given discretionary jurisdiction 
with the Judiciary Act of 1925. Immediately following the Judiciary Act, the justices created a 
“dead list”, or cases not to be discussed. Later, the dead list was dropped in favor of a “discuss” 
list. Justice Stevens describes it: “In the 1975 Term, when I joined the Court, I found that other 
procedural changes had occurred. The 'dead list' had been replaced by a 'discuss list'; now the 
chief justice circulates a list of cases he deems worthy of discussion and each of the other 
members of the Court may add cases to it" (Stevens 1983, 13). Stevens (1983) argues the change 
from dead list to discuss list was meaningful, as it changed how attention was given to each 
petition. Originally, every petition was debated unless it was placed on the dead list, and now no 
petition is discussed unless it is placed on the discuss list. Rarely do the justices browse the full 
list of petitions; clerks who make up the certiorari pool largely analyze the petitions first.   
Caldeira and Wright (1990) examine what aspects of petitions increase the likelihood that 
the Court will place them on the discuss list. Variables such as the U.S. being a party, lower 
court conflicts, issue areas (Civil Liberties), ideological distance, and amicus curiae participation 
were tested. Some aspects have a strong impact on the likelihood of making it to the discuss list: 
If all of the qualities except the United States as a petitioner, amicus briefs, and real 
conflict are present in a case, it [petition] has a .39 probability of making the discuss list. 
The addition of an amicus curiae brief increases the probability of discussion to .74. 
Similarly, on the decision on a writ of certiorari absent the United States as a petitioner, 
an amicus brief, and actual conflict, the addition of an amicus brief more than doubles its 
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chances. The message seems clear: organized interests as amici curiae perform an 
especially central role in both stages of the decision. (Caldeira and Wright 1990, 831).  
 
In addition, the authors find that the S.G. gets over 90% of the cases they are a part of 
placed on the discuss list, and more amicus briefs further increase the likelihood of placement on 
the list.  
The Court needs legitimacy from the public to operate and cannot enforce decisions 
alone, meaning opinions of other government institutions and the public are likely considered 
(Caldeira 1986; Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson and Caldeira 1998; Ignagni and Meernik 
1994; Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005; Hettinger and Zorn 2005; Curry, Pacelle, and 
Marshall 2008; Hall 2014; Gibson and Nelson 2015). While the Court does have a reliance on 
other institutions, generally, their decisions are carried out and executed faithfully (Curry 2007; 
Chutkow 2008; Carrubba and Zorn 2010). Indeed, some argue that compliance from other 
government institutions is due to the high amounts of support and legitimacy for the Court, given 
by the public.  
I argue and explore more in depth in chapter 6 about public attention being another yet-
to-be-tested impact on the discuss list. I posit that when an issue is highly salient among the 
public, the Court will spend more time deliberating petitions related to the salient issue area. This 
is not due to the Justices wishing to appease the public or out of fear of retribution from other 
branches, but because the outside actors change their behavior (i.e. file more briefs / convince the 
Court it is worth the time) which influences the Justices to do so. 
Either due to concerns about maintaining their legitimacy, replacing the justices, or 
wanting to tackle issues the public cares about, the Court generally tracks public opinion at the 
merits stage. Some argue that the Court’s mechanism of following public opinion at the merits 
stage is due to the replacement of justices over time (Norpoth and Segal 1994; Giles, Blackstone 
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and Vining 2008) or due to constraints perceived from other elected branches (Chutkow 2008; 
Harvey and Friedman 2009). The public elects the President who selects future justices, as well 
as the senators who confirm them. Thus, the installation of a new justice would then be reflective 
of public opinion at that time. Others argue that public opinion produces a real constraint on 
judicial decision making at the merits stage, regardless of the changes in composition of the 
justices (Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Hurwitz, Mishler, 
and Sheehan 2004; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011).  
I present a detailed argument in Chapter 6 about if the Court decides cases with an eye to 
public opinion at the merits stage, the justices may also do so during the certiorari process. The 
justices and their clerks are a part of the society and it is a reasonable assumption they are aware 
of the issues that are salient to the public at any given time (Caldeira and Wright 1990; Giles, 
Blackstone, and Vining 2008; Baum 2009; Fix 2014). Chapter 6 specifically examines how 
public attention influences the amount of time the Court spends on each petition.  
2.6 Conclusion 
Scholars have shown that the Court is responsive to external actors in its decision making 
in several ways. First, the Court generally tracks public opinion at the merits stage, regardless of 
the changes in the composition of the justices (Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Stimson, MacKuen, 
and Erikson 1995; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011). Second, the 
Court defers to the executive branch at both the merits and certiorari stages when their attorneys 
take part in the case. For example, once the S.G. has made the government’s position clear, the 
Court sides with the government most of the times (Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005; 
Wolfarth 2009), and when the S.G. submits an amicus brief recommending the Court to hear a 
case, the Court is much more likely to do so (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Provine 1980; 
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Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer 1984; Owens 2010). Third, at the certiorari stage, the Court takes 
notice when a petition garners a high amount of amicus curiae briefs. Generally, as the number 
of amicus briefs increase (either for or against the petitioner), there is a higher likelihood that the 
Supreme Court will hear the case (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Perry 1991; Baum and Neal 2009). 
In addition, legal arguments contained within briefs filed at the merits stage of the process often 
make their way into the final opinion as well, indicating that they are informative to the justices 
and have an impact on the eventual precedent set (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997; Kearney and 
Merrill 2000; Corley 2008).  
This project builds on previous research and argues that public interest in an issue area 
can have an indirect effect on the likelihood of petitions being placed on the discuss list, and 
ultimately being granted certiorari. I argue that when an issue becomes highly salient to the 
public, formal actors such as the S.G. and interest groups are likely to increase their participation 
in petitions dealing with these salient issue areas. The justices and clerks notice the actions taken 
by these key legal actors and alter the discuss list accordingly, thus indirectly increasing the 
likelihood of the Court granting certiorari to petitions dealing with that salient issue area.  
In the next chapter I introduce my measure of public attention. I show how it was 
constructed and compare its results with another measure used to determine what is important to 
Americans on a national level: Gallup’s Most Important Problem survey.  
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3 CHAPTER 3: MEASURING PUBLIC ATTENTION 
3.1 Introduction 
 When scholars wish to empirically examine a phenomenon, they often create their own 
data or try and incorporate a measure created by others into their work. In George Bohrnstedt’s 
(2010) presentation of measurement in social sciences, he comments on a trend where our 
measures are not capturing what we wish them to capture. He argues there are clear and fuzzy 
measures in social science. Clear measures include age, marital status, race, income, etc., 
whereas concepts such as attitudes or beliefs often require assumptions to wedge them into our 
empirical models and theories. Bohrnstedt argues that when measures which do not accurately 
capture what the researcher is looking to examine are used, theories are bent to accommodate 
measures, watering down both theories and findings. In response to this presentation, discussants 
noted that this trend “also leads to the development of ‘habitual measurement practices,’ that is, 
relying on the same measures regardless of whether they truly represent the theoretical constructs 
of interest” (National Research Council 2011, p. 16). Creating measures for specific questions is 
important, and for this project, a new measure is required. I am concerned with finding out how 
much the public is talking about an issue.    
Since 2006 a paradigm shift has occurred in how people share information and 
communicate with each other. The public now, more than ever, has multiple platforms to openly 
discuss topics it finds interesting or outraging. The use of social media has become pervasive, 
with surveys reliably suggesting that 80% of American adults are online, and a large majority 
engage with at least one social media platform per day.14 Social media companies such as 
                                                 
14 Dr. Nicole Ellison and Dr. Cliff Lampe. Social Media Update 2016. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. 
(November 11th, 2016). http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016 
 Maeve Duggan. Social Media Update 2015. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (August 19th, 2015). 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/mobile-messaging-and-social-media-2015 
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Twitter and Facebook exploded in popularity in 2008 through 2010, with both platforms growing 
at over 1,000% a year (Golbeck, Grimes, and Rogers 2010). Adoption of social media is 
particularly strong among younger Americans, with 90% of 18-24-year old’s using multiple 
platforms daily. Among all adult Americans, a stunning 69% regularly communicate on at least 
one social media platform, with about half using Twitter.15 Participation in social media 
generally crosses racial, socioeconomic, gender, and community lines. Minorities use social 
media at the same rates as whites, as do women and men, those in rural or urban areas, as well as 
those at various levels of income.16 These online interactions and conversations are tracked and 
archived, leaving open the possibility to gauge what topics and issues are given the most 
attention by the public at any given moment.  
Others have used data from social media to help answer an array of important questions 
such as how social media influences political participation (Gibson, Lusoli, and Ward 2005; 
Gainous and Wagner 2011; Bond et al. 2012; Boulianne 2015), how news coverage is affected 
by social media (Wallsten 2011), and how social media is impacting polarization (Howard et al. 
2011; Gainous and Wagner 2013). This project is not the first to use data from social media, 
however, to my knowledge it is the first to use counts of social media activity to capture attention 
to an issue area. 
This chapter proceeds with a brief background on other salience measures widely used in 
public law, followed by an explanation of how I collected the data for my public attention 
measure. After explaining the measurement collection process, I validate the measure against one 
                                                 
Duggan et al. Social Media Update 2015. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (January 9th, 2014). 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/09/social-media-update-2014 
15 Aaron Smith and Monica Anderson. Social Media Update 2018. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. 
(March 1st, 2018) 
16 Social Media Fact Sheet. February 5th, 2018. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ 
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I feel is trying to get at a similar concept: the Gallup Most Important Problem survey. I 
demonstrate that while my measure and the Gallup measure are similar, they also have important 
distinctions that separates the two. I conclude with a summary of findings and introduce chapter 
4, the first empirical chapter.  
3.2 Argument for a new Public Attention Measure 
There are two types of salience as measured in the public law literature: political salience 
and legal salience (Cook 1993). For an issue to be legally salient it must be “important” insofar 
as how it affects the law, the people who work with and are close to the law (Maltzman, Spriggs, 
and Wahlbeck 2000). Political salience by contrast can be described as an issue being highly 
important to the public or politicians but not necessarily to those of the legal community (Epstein 
and Segal 2000). Issues such as abortion, gay rights, guns, etc., are typically classified as 
politically salient cases. A case can be legally salient, politically salient, both, or neither.  
The most widespread measure of salience within public law is the Epstein and Segal 
(2000) New York Times salience measure (NYT). To capture which issues are politically salient, 
the NYT measure reviews the front page of The New York Times the day after the Supreme Court 
decides a case. If the case appears on the front page the day following the decision, it is marked 
as salient; if not, it is marked as not salient. Others have taken this method and expanded the 
number of newspapers to produce a more comprehensive assessment of salience (Collins and 
Cooper 2011; Clark, Lax, and Rice 2015). Within the states, scholars have used the same 
approach as Epstein and Segal, but instead of using major national papers, they use the largest 
newspaper in each state by circulation and again look for state supreme court cases on their front 
pages (Vining and Wilhelm 2009).  
32 
To gather data on legal and political salience outside of newspapers, scholars have 
created an array of other measures. Some use annual polling data such as the Gallup Most 
Important Problem Survey to gauge what issue is most on top of mind for the public (Fix 2014). 
There have also been attempts to capture legal salience, arguing that measuring how much the 
justices speak during oral arguments can be a proxy for how important that issue is for each 
justice (Black, Sorenson, and Johnson 2013). Other examples include using case citations in 
constitutional law textbooks as a proxy for salience (Slotnick 1978), or the number of amicus 
curiae briefs submitted (Maltzman and Wahlbeck 1996).   
While useful, nearly all existing measures are captured after the case or certiorari has 
been decided or are part of a survey of pre-determined responses, lacking an unfiltered view of 
what the public is talking about. A more useful measure of salience, particularly when studying 
the influence of the public, would observe opinion while petitions are being debated. Unlike 
previous measures of salience, my social media measure overcomes concerns about capturing 
information ex post facto, or at a single instance in time. Rather, this measure provides dynamic, 
contemporaneous information about what issues the public cares about. 
The pervasiveness of social media, along with sophisticated tracking data, enables 
researchers with the ability to identify what issues are being discussed, how often, and is superior 
for this type of analysis over traditional methods. Harnessing data available from what is 
expressed online can help scholars identify what exactly the public is talking about at any given 
moment. The public’s opinion on what is important may change depending on current events. 
Data from social media is live, constantly updating, and includes the entire universe of people 
using social media. Due to social media’s pervasiveness, the data derived is a true window into 
what the public is talking about.  
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3.3 Creating the Measure 
Due to access limitations, I selected three issue areas on which to collect data regarding 
how much the public talked about an issue between 2010 and 2017. The three issues selected 
were abortion, campaign finance, and anti-trust. I selected these issues for a few reasons. First, I 
wanted issues that are distinct from one another with no concerns that my capturing of public 
conversation would be seen as grabbing the same conversation twice. Second, I wanted to vary 
the levels of salience. Abortion is routinely listed as one of American’s top concerns,17 while 
campaign finance’s salience waxes and wanes; anti-trust is a more technical issue that generally 
garners little public attention. Finally, I wanted to make sure to collect information on issues that 
are regularly appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
To collect data regarding how much attention the public has paid to the selected three 
issues over time, I used a service named Sifter. Sifter has a special research relationship with 
Twitter, and their data company, GNIP, which allows Sifter to request Twitter activity data. 
After the search parameters are set, GNIP/Sifter takes a sample of all Tweets within the time 
selected and gives an estimate of Twitter activity. These samples from GNIP/Sifter are highly 
accurate; GNIP/Sifter will use these estimates to charge customers seeking more data on the 
tweets in question. In this case, I set parameters for every month from January 2010 through 
December 2017 for each of the three topic areas, resulting in a count of Twitter activity by month 
by issue area. Due to Twitter’s relatively small public adoption in their earlier years, I use the 
years 2010 through 2017.18 As an example, to determine how much attention campaign finance 
was receiving in September 2013, the following search process was utilized:  
                                                 
17 Public Opinion on Abortion. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (10/15/2018). 
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion 
18Number of monthly active Twitter users worldwide https://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/number-of-
monthly-active-twitter-users/ 
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• Boolean search for Campaign Finance would read as follows: ("Citizens United v. FEC" 
OR "Citizens United" OR "Campaign Finance" OR "Campaign Finance reform" OR 
"Dark money" OR "Money in politics" OR pac OR pacs OR "Super PAC" OR "Super 
PACs")19,20 
• An example date would be specified (e.g., 09/01/2013 through 09/30/2013) 
• United States would be set as the geographic area 
For example, the above scenario for September 2013 registered 431,000 mentions of 
Campaign Finance on Twitter. September 2015 registered 476,000 mentions. I repeat this 
process for every month and every topic area between January 2010 and December 2017. 
Because Twitter’s popularity increased over time, I normalize my measure of the number 
of mentions of a topic area per month based on average Twitter usage during that time period. In 
September 2010, there were approximately 14 million Twitter users. In September 2017, that 
number increased to 69 million. Thus, 500,000 tweets in 2010 is a larger percent of Twitter 
activity than it is in 2017. To ensure my measure of public attention can be compared over time, 
I divide the total number of mentions by topic area/month by the total number of Twitter users 
during each quarter. (Twitter does not report user base statistics by month – only by quarter.) 
This procedure provides a standardized measure of public attention for these three topic areas 
from 2010-2017.  Therefore, it serves as a reliable gauge of public attention that is comparable 
over the years. Public attention is thus the average of Twitter activity for that petition’s topic 
area over the previous twelve months. 
3.4 Validating and Exploring the Measure 
There are no other direct comparisons to validate this new measure; however, past 
research utilizes methods that are roughly approximate to the data I collected for this project. 
                                                 
19 Boolean search refers to a type of search allowing users to combine keywords with operators such as AND, NOT 
and OR to further produce more relevant results.  
20 Boolean search phrases used are available in Appendix C of the dissertation. Key words were chosen based on 
words most often used in conjunction with the primary issue area of interest. 
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One relevant measure of what is important to Americans is data from Gallup’s Most Important 
Problem survey. Gallup’s survey asks Americans to select what issues are the most important 
problem. Researchers affiliated with the Policy Agendas Project (PAP) have recoded Gallup’s 
data according to the PAP content coding by “major topic” to create the Recoded MIP Data Set 
(Heffington, Park, and Williams 2017).  The MIP Data Set contains annual information 
regarding what respondents deemed the most important problem in the United States from 1947 
to 2018. By using this data as a means of comparison, I will show correlations between survey 
responses and data collected via social media.  
I need to be clear that this is not a 1:1 comparison. The data I collected relates to very 
specific issue areas (abortion, campaign finance, and anti-trust), whereas the MIP Data Set and 
Gallup’s survey lump together issues into broader categories. For example, abortion is coded as 
“civil rights,” and campaign finance falls into the broad category of “government operations.” 
While this is not an exact validation, I believe the topic areas and my issue areas are relatable 
enough for meaningful comparison. Further, I focus specifically on the campaign finance and 
abortion issue areas as anti-trust does not show dramatic fluctuation in either my public attention 
variable or the MIP data set. As a reminder, anti-trust was specifically selected because of its 
generally low conversation rates.  
3.4.1 Public Attention to Abortion, Campaign Finance, and Anti-trust 
In Chapter 1, I reviewed the story surrounding Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett.21 In this case, the Supreme Court sided with the petitioners to strike down 
a 1998 Arizona law that gave candidates for statewide office funds depending on how much 
money their opponents spent. I argued in the introduction that the relatively intense attention this 
                                                 
21 Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011) 
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petition received in the form of powerful lawyers and amicus briefs was partly due to the 
increase in public attention campaign finance received during this period in time. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the level of public attention to campaign finance from 2010 through 2017. This data is 
derived from Twitter and illustrates fluctuations in how much Americans discussed the issue 
over time.     
 
Figure 3.1: Public Attention to Campaign Finance – Twitter 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Most Important Problem - Government 
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Figure 3.1 shows in the first and second quarter of 2010, just before the filing of the 
Arizona petition, public attention toward campaign finance reached a near all-time high. If one 
searches for news articles for any of these issue areas along with the date of each spike, it is 
generally easy to see what event rallied public interest. Public attention toward campaign finance 
lowers considerably in later 2010 but reaches its highest levels of public salience in 2012, during 
the presidential campaign. In 2012, the term “Super PACs” entered the American lexicon, and 
that same year, John Edwards was on trial for campaign finance violations. The issue falls off 
most American’s radar until Bernie Sanders enters the 2016 presidential race, and the issue has 
remained salient, with some volatile spikes ever since.  
When compared to the Gallup/MIP survey data regarding what issue is the most 
important, there are similar peaks and valleys. The data from Twitter reports by quarter per year 
along the X axis, whereas the MIP data reports annually. Figure 3.2 illustrates the same time 
period, but for the corresponding “major topic” that the Comparative Agendas Project places 
campaign finance within. The data from these two different-but-similar sources/issue areas both 
show an increasing slope in early 2010, spiking in 2012 followed by a dip, and then an ever-
increasing curve since the 2016 election. Again, I realize this is not an apples-to-apples 
comparison but given campaign finance is often a major concern of government operations, I 
believe it is a feasible means to compare measures.  
Abortion is the next issue area I compare to the Gallup/PAP MIP data. Abortion is an 
issue area that never fades from public discourse and is simultaneously salient and not at top of 
mind. Polling finds that nearly all adult Americans, 95%, have some opinion on abortion and 
how the government should legislate on the issue.22 Thus, I expect abortion to be the most talked 
                                                 
22 Public Opinion on Abortion. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (10/15/2018). 
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion  
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about issue among the three topics I selected. Figure 3.3 and 3.4 show how attention has shifted 
toward abortion/civil rights over the same time 2010-2017 period.  
 
Figure 3.3: Public Attention to Abortion – Twitter 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Most Important Problem – Civil Rights 
 
 The data from both sources, while not measuring the exact same issue area (MIP would 
also include gay rights, freedom of speech, etc.) have a remarkably similar distribution. Figure 
3.3 shows a relatively low amount of public attention to abortion that remains stable until the 
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final quarter of 2016. The MIP data in 3.4 also shows a steep increase of Americans responding 
that civil rights are the most important problem over the same period. The end of 2016 coincided 
with the election of Donald Trump, and in January 2017 he signed an executive order banning 
federal money to groups that perform or provide information on abortions. Afterwards there have 
been other developments in this topic area, keeping the issue highly discussed among Americans.  
 While looking at these two topic areas independently shows a clear comparison between 
the MIP and Twitter data, I believe there is value in laying these figures on top of one another in 
order to get an idea of how much more or less each topic is discussed when compared to each 
other. Figure 3.5 combines all three topics’ Twitter data to illustrate how much Americans are 
talking about abortion versus campaign finance and anti-trust. Figure 3.6 does the same but uses 
MIP data.  
 
Figure 3.5: Public Attention to Abortion, Anti-trust, and Campaign Finance - Twitter 
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Figure 3.6: Most Important Problem - Civil Rights and Government 
  
 When all issue areas are compared, it is apparent in figure 3.5 that after Citizens United 
was decided, the public paid much more attention to campaign finance than the other two topics. 
Interestingly in 3.6 the same trend does not occur. Both figures show an increase in respondents 
identifying the issue as the most important problem or talking more about the issue on Twitter at 
roughly the same time. However, there is a meaningful difference between the two measures that 
I believe is a strength for using social media. The data gathered from Twitter is capturing what 
people are saying online as they are talking about it versus the data from Gallup’s MIP survey is 
a survey from a moment in time with pre-determined options. Thus, while respondents may want 
to tell a survey that they are most concerned with civil rights or another issue, they are talking 
more about campaign finance, at least in 2010 through 2012. Using data from Gallup over the 
years of 2010 – 2016 might suggest an over representation of Americans being concerned with 
civil rights when they are talking and tweeting about different issue areas. The respondents may 
believe civil rights are a more important issue, however, when interest groups, corporations, 
elected officials, and the news media see what is trending online, they will see what the public is 
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talking about instead of what they respond to on a survey. Again, the goal of this measure is to 
quantify how much Americans are talking about specific issues over time, and I believe it 
reliably does that.  
 Returning to figure 3.5, it is worth noting that while anti-trust does not reach public 
conversation levels near the other two topic areas, there is fluctuation within the topic itself. 
Further, as empirically shown in subsequent chapters, these relatively minor fluctuations in the 
public attention given to anti-trust (as well as the other two) causes meaningful responses by 
outside actors in litigation.  
3.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter began with a discussion about how measures need to be made and used for 
precise questions in order to help inform precise theories. I then discussed how many Americans 
now use social media to communicate with one another and voice their opinions. After reviewing 
other measures used, I discussed how the Gallup/Policy Agendas Project MIP Data set is 
somewhat comparable to the data I gathered from Twitter. There are similarities between the 
two, but also important differences. The MIP data is a survey at a moment in time, giving 
respondents a selection of issues to select. Gathering data from Twitter provides a more direct 
and truthful representation of what the public is talking about at any given moment. Further, data 
gathered from social media can be exact versus falling into large and general “major topic” areas 
such as civil liberties. One can explicitly look at what and how much Americans are saying about 
an issue if we utilize the data available to us instead of relying on surveys or newspapers.   
Data regarding what the public is talking about on social media is the clearest way to 
capture public attention to an issue. Due to social media’s pervasiveness, use, and widespread 
adoption in the United States. I argue that this pervasiveness means that conversations online are 
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not a sample of the public’s conversation, but the actual, entire conversation. Thus, capturing 
what the public is talking about online is capturing what the public is talking about on the whole. 
Once fully realized, this measure has the possibility of furthering our ability to understand how 
the public may influence elite agenda-setting and decision-making writ large. This measure 
provides an important opportunity to create a dynamic measure of public attention/opinion that 
may aid us in moving beyond some of the issues surrounding traditional methods of collecting 
public opinion, such as surveys, or other methods of gathering this information.  
In this chapter I compared my measure of public attention to the MIP survey data from 
the Policy Agendas Project. Generally, my measure tracks with what respondents believe to be 
the most important problem over the same time period. Distinctively, however, the measure 
derived from social media is more precise in topic versus the wide categories used by the PAP. 
Further, my measure shows that while respondents on a survey may list one thing as the most 
important issue, they are talking about something else in their day to day interactions. Thus, this 
measure is a valid and important way to gauge what the public is talking about at any given point 
and is superior to other measures attempting to capture a similar metric.  
 Chapter 4 begins the empirical analysis of this project and asks how public attention 
impacts the likelihood of special interests, government attorneys, and others to file amicus curiae 
briefs before a petition has been granted/denied certiorari. I employ the measure discussed here 
to find that as public attention toward an issue area increases, so too does the likelihood of these 
impactful documents being filed.  
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4 CHAPTER 4: PUBLIC ATTENTION AND AMICUS BRIEFS 
4.1 Introduction 
Amicus curiae briefs are documents submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court that argue 
either in favor or opposition to the Court granting certiorari to a particular case, or in favor of a 
particular legal outcome if the case is accepted for a full hearing. These documents are influential 
and, in general, are intended to let the Court know what the governmental entity, interest group, 
or concerned citizen who files the brief thinks about the merit or implications of the petition.  
Recent terms have seen a dramatic increase in the number of amicus briefs filed. In 
January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed an executive order which for 90 days barred 
entry of foreign nationals from specific countries as a security risk. The executive order was 
commonly known as the “travel ban,” and it incited nationwide protest, received wide coverage 
on news media, and generated heated debate on social media; the ban was also immediately 
challenged in federal district court. On March 29, 2017, the United States District Court for the 
District of Hawaii granted an injunction to stop the Trump administration from enacting the 
travel ban from specific countries. On appeal the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower 
court and blocked implementation of the ban on May 15th, 2017. On June 1st, 2017, the Trump 
administration filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging these decisions. During the four 
months between filing of the petition and the Court making a certiorari decision, the case 
received a staggering 88 amicus briefs – the most of any petition from 2010 through 2017 by a 
wide margin.  
In reviewing other salient petitions, such as abortion and gay marriage, a clear link 
emerges between those related to issues with high amounts of public attention receiving the 
majority of amicus briefs before a certiorari decision. In the 2014-2015 Supreme Court term, 
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there were 147amicus briefs23  filed during both the certiorari (beginning) and merits (end) stage 
in Obergefell v. Hodges.24 One hundred and thirty-six amici were filed in the cases surrounding 
the Obamacare decision, 156 split between two other gay marriage cases Hollingsworth v. 
Perry25 and United States v. Windsor,26 and 47 were filed in the Texas abortion case Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.27 These issues generated high amounts of public attention, and in 
turn received a record-breaking number of amicus briefs. While the Court is purposely designed 
to be insulated from public opinion, there may be other, more nuanced ways the public is helping 
set the agenda at the highest court in the land.  
4.2 Insulated but Still Impacted 
The Supreme Court is highly insulated from the shifting landscape of public opinion due 
to its position at the apex of the federal judiciary and the justices’ life tenure. However, there is 
also considerable debate regarding how much the Court responds to public preferences. 
Examinations of decisions on the merits produce mixed results. Some scholars show evidence of 
mass and elite opinions constraining the justices’ decision making (Mishler and Sheehan 1993; 
McGuire and Stimson 2004; Clark 2009; Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011), while others cast 
doubt on public opinion as a causal mechanism (Norpoth and Segal 1994; Segal and Spaeth 
2002; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). While a wealth of research is devoted to what 
influences the Court’s decision making on the merits, there is relatively little research regarding 
how the public may influence the Court at the certiorari stage of the process. 
                                                 
23 The National Law Journal, August 19, 2015.  
24 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. (2015) 
25 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. (2013) 
26 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. (2013) 
27 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. (2016) 
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This chapter investigates whether the public indirectly influences Supreme Court 
certiorari decisions through amicus curiae briefs. Prior research demonstrates that salient 
petitions increase the likelihood of special interest groups and government officials filing amicus 
curiae briefs (Solowiej and Collins 2009; Zuber, Sommer, and Parent 2015). However, no other 
studies connect public interest, salience, or attention to amici filings. Increasing our 
understanding of what factors encourage (or discourage) amici briefs is important due to their 
strong impact on the certiorari process. Studies routinely find that the presence of amici briefs 
increases the likelihood the Court will grant certiorari, underscoring why we need to understand 
what types of petitions are most likely to secure amici (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Collins 2004). 
I argue that when public interest in a given issue area is high, interest groups and others seeking 
to capitalize on public interest are more likely to file amici briefs.  
4.3 Certiorari and the Supreme Court 
As mentioned earlier in the dissertation, there are many different aspects of an appeal that 
increase the probability that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari. Some issues such as civil 
liberties are more likely to be granted than others, and the number of amicus briefs filed along 
with solicitor general participation generally increases a petitions chances (Tanenhaus et al. 
1963; Ulmer, Hintze, and Kirklosky 1972; Caldeira and Wright 1988; Collins 2004; Nicholson 
and Collins 2008; Wohlfarth 2009).   
While a small yet rich literature addresses the cert process, understanding how the public 
impacts this process is largely unexplored. As detailed in Chapter 2, when the public is 
particularly attentive to an issue area, the entire complexion of litigation may change due to 
actions of outside actors. Interest groups eager to please their members may seize on such cases 
and file amici briefs or hire powerful attorneys to litigate these issues. Government officials may 
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take a policy stand, directing their attorneys (i.e. the Solicitor General) to litigate a publicly 
salient issue. Elected attorneys general in the states may also feel that it is important to act on an 
issue when the public is paying more attention to it. Thus, I argue that outside actors keep the 
public in mind, and when the public is paying more attention to an issue area, these outside 
actors are more likely to file amici briefs, influencing the Court. 
4.4 Amicus curiae 
Amicus curiae briefs provide strong cues for the Supreme Court. Amici briefs are filed by 
individuals or entities who are not formally a party to the case.28 Amici briefs can be submitted 
both at the certiorari or merits stage.29 These briefs can serve as a cue for justices to understand 
what people ideologically similar/distant believe, if other institutions prefer one outcome or cert 
to be/not be granted, and/or if the legal community has an opinion on certiorari.  
Amici briefs are effective, particularly at the certiorari stage. Generally, as the number of 
amicus briefs increase (either for or against the petitioner), there is a higher likelihood that the 
Supreme Court will hear the case (Caldeira and Wright 1988, 1990; Perry 1991; Baum and Neal 
2009). In fact, nearly all cases accepted by the Supreme Court have amici briefs filed (Epstein 
and Knight 1999; Kearney and Merrill 2000). While the total number of amicus per term is flat 
from 2010 through 2017,30 on larger time periods there has been an increase in the number of 
amicus briefs filed over time from special interests and large organizations (Epstein and Knight 
1998; Collins 2004). Interestingly, the legal arguments contained within briefs filed at the merits 
stage of the process often make their way into the final opinion as well, indicating that they are 
informative to the justices and can have an impact on the eventual precedent set (Spriggs and 
                                                 
28 Rules of the Supreme Court no. 37: Brief for an Amicus curiae 
29 After a petition has been granted, new amici briefs are submitted to persuade the justices to rule one way or 
another. 
30 Appendix Figure A.1 illustrates the number of amicus curiae from 2010 through 2017.  
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Wahlbeck 1997; Kearney and Merill 2000; Corley 2008). In addition, this effect is similar for 
amicus briefs filed in the circuit courts of appeal (Martinek 2006).  
While expensive, many interest groups find filing an amicus brief to be money well 
spent. Members of special interest organizations want their organizations to influence policy 
change, and these briefs are tangible evidence of such attempts (Solowiej and Collins 2009). 
Interest groups use the creation of an important document such as an amicus brief as a 
demonstration to its membership of attempting to influence policy (Wasby 1995; Collins and 
Martinek 2010; Zuber, Sommer, and Parent 2015).  
Some argue that amici participation can be a proxy for public attention or public salience 
on a given case. With no direct way to capture salience on a specific case or issue area, scholars 
argue that increased amici participation signals more public or legal interest. Studies find that the 
Court pays more attention to certiorari petitions with high levels of amici participation 
(Hansford and Damore 2000; Maltzman and Wahlbeck 1996; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 
2000; Collins 2004). Thus, attention paid by the public suggests a connection between public 
salience and an increase in the likelihood of granting certiorari to salient petitions.  
Most scholars examine which cases receive amicus briefs, as opposed to why 
organizations file amici in the first place. Cases receiving amici briefs are then used as an ex post 
facto proxy for public salience. However, why are amici attracted to particular cases as opposed 
to others? My argument is that interested parties are more likely to file a brief on a case related to 
a specific issue area if it is salient to their relative constituencies. Interest groups and elected 
members of government (including state governments) have an interest in appealing to their 
constituencies and/or members, along with influencing policy. I argue that an increase in public 
attention to an issue area may induce these groups/government bodies to file more amici briefs to 
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show they are involved, performing the job their supporters expect of them. Thus, increased 
attention from the public is likely to produce more amicus briefs related to a salient issue area, 
which in turn leads the Supreme Court to be more likely to accept petitions related to that issue.   
Interest groups are major players in issuing these briefs as it helps show their members 
they are actively attempting to change policy (Wasby 1995; Hansford 2004; Collins 2004, 2008; 
Solowiej and Collins 2009; Collins and Martinek 2010; Zuber, Sommer, and Parent 2015). I 
argue the more salient the issue area, the more likely interest groups, lobbying firms, and others 
will be to file an amicus brief on a case addressing that issue in order to satiate their members. I 
further argue, and test in Chapter 6, that these actions by key legal actors in turn raise the 
likelihood of these (salient issue) petitions being granted cert.  
4.5 Data and Methods 
To examine the effect of public attention on the likelihood of amici brief filings to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, I gathered every paid petition filed between years 2010 to 2017. In forma 
paperatis (IFP) petitions were not collected because most IFP petitions are criminal appeals 
which have much less flexibility in their ability to be overturned and are much less likely to be 
granted certiorari (Feldman and Kappner 2016). I used a web text-scraping code to gather all 
paid petitions to the U.S. Supreme Court from 2010 through 2017. 31  This scraping procedure 
netted 12,016 paid petitions over the eight terms.  
After gathering the petitions filed during my time of interest, I identified all cases that fall 
into my three topic areas of interest: abortion, anti-trust, or campaign finance. The resulting sub-
                                                 
31 Web scrapers are code that can automatically collect data from websites. In this case, a web scraper would input a 
petition number, collect the data, and move on to the next petition number for each year of interest.   
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data-set includes 160 petitions related to either abortion, anti-trust, or campaign finance from 
2010 through 2017.32  
4.5.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this analysis is the total number of amici briefs filed for each 
petition before a certiorari decision. The resulting variable is a count, ranging from zero to 14. 
Because the dependent variable is a count of amicus briefs, I use a negative binomial regression. 
Additional reasoning for a negative binomial estimation and a comparison between alternative 
model specifications are located in Appendix B.1. My expectation is that as public attention 
increases for a given topic area, there will be more Amici Before Cert filed for petitions related to 
that issue area.  
4.5.2 Independent Variables 
My primary independent variable of interest is Public Attention. As explained in detail in 
Chapter 3, this variable reflects a standardized measure of the average monthly number of 
mentions of a topic area in the previous twelve months. Again, due to Twitter’s relatively small 
public adoption in their earlier years, I examine the years 2010 through 2017.33 
I also account for whether the U.S. is a party to the case. The Solicitor General is an 
important player in the cert process, and if he or she is involved, the likelihood of certiorari 
being granted increases dramatically (Nicholson and Collins 2008; Wohlfarth 2009). The S.G. is 
successful because she thoughtfully picks which cases to present to the Court, while also 
representing an important legal player – the executive branch. Thus, if the S.G. argues for the 
U.S. Supreme Court to hear a case – and does so in specifically selected cases – then the Court is 
                                                 
32 While the number of cases in the data-set is not large, it is sufficient for my analysis.  
33Number of monthly active Twitter users worldwide https://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/number-of-
monthly-active-twitter-users/ 
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likely to heed that call as a sign that it is a case that needs to be decided. Given the importance of 
the Solicitor General and the federal government, I created a dichotomous variable to account for 
if the federal government is party to the case. 
Further, ideological distance between the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts is a well-
documented cue for the Supreme Court and also a factor in how litigators decide which cases to 
appeal. When a lower court is ideologically distant from the U.S. Supreme Court, it is more 
likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in order to “correct” a lower court’s decision 
(Scott 2006; Owens and Simon 2011; Grant, Hendrickson, and Lynch 2012). Given this 
information, it is important to control for ideological distance as outside actors may understand 
this relationship and write more or less amicus briefs because of it.  
To estimate the ideological distance between the Supreme Court and the lower circuits, I 
rely on the Judicial Common Space measure from Epstein et al. 2007. The Judicial Common 
Space (J.C.S.) measure estimates the median ideological score for the Supreme Court and all 11 
circuits plus D.C. I take the absolute value of the difference between Supreme Court and lower 
each court medians per term. This absolute value increases as the distance between the courts 
grows. For example, in 2011 the median J.C.S. score for the 9th circuit was -0.2585 and the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s median was 0.2107.34 The resulting difference is a value of 0.4692. A majority 
of petitions to the Supreme Court are from the Circuit courts. Of the 12,016 petitions, 8,142 are 
from a circuit court whereas 3,874 are not. Petitions originating from courts where ideology 
scores are not available (many states and individual district courts) are excluded from the models 
including this Ideological Distance variable.  
                                                 
34 Judicial Common Space scores are coded as such that a positive number indicates a more conservative median 
whereas a negative value indicates a more liberal median.  
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4.6 Results  
An overview of the dependent variable for the first model is displayed in Table 3.1. Over 
half of all petitions related to my three topic areas of interest received zero amicus briefs before a 
decision on certiorari was made. Generally, if a petition receives an amicus brief, it will receive 
one to four, with petitions receiving more than four being exceedingly rare.   
Table 4.1: Amicus curiae Before Cert 
Number of Amici Frequency Percent Cumulative  
0 6,938 85.21 85.21 
1 582 7.15 92.36 
2 264 3.24 95.6 
3 132 1.62 97.22 
4 89 1.09 98.32 
5 46 0.56 98.88 
6 30 0.37 99.25 
7 21 0.26 99.51 
8 12 0.15 99.66 
9 8 0.1 99.75 
10 6 0.07 99.83 
11 3 0.04 99.86 
12 2 0.02 99.89 
13 2 0.02 99.91 
14 3 0.04 99.95 
15 1 0.01 99.96 
18 1 0.01 99.98 
78 1 0.01 99.99 
88 1 0.01 100 
Total 8,142 100.00  
 
Before testing the primary hypothesis of this chapter, I first confirm past findings 
regarding the importance of amici briefs in the certiorari process. For this model I use all 
petitions filed from 2010 through 2017 that appealed a case from a federal circuit court (8,142). I 
created a dichotomous variable indicating if certiorari was granted (1) or denied (0). I then 
include the Amici Before Cert variable, along with an indicator of if a solicitor general (state or 
federal) was party to the case, Ideological Distance, and a variable denoting how many days 
were taken to arrive at a decision. Table 3.2 displays the estimates of this logit model.  
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The results show that amici briefs filed before a cert decision have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the likelihood of cert being granted for the petition. Further, 
state or federal solicitors general being party to the petition also increase the likelihood of 
certiorari being granted, supporting previous findings. Additionally, the more days the Court 
spends discussing a petition has a positive and significant impact on Certiorari. This impact of 
discussion-time is more thoroughly explored in Chapter 6. Finally, contrary to previous research, 
the Ideological Distance between lower circuit courts and the Supreme Court does not have a 
statistically significant influence, although the coefficient is positively signed.  
Table 4.2: Certiorari Outcome and Amicus Briefs 
 Granted Certiorari p-value 
Amici Before Cert 0.348 0.000 
 (0.025)  
Ideological Distance 0.49 0.114 
 (0.31)  
S.G. Party to Case 0.24 0.038 
 (0.116)  
Discussion in days 0.007 0.000 
 (0.0005)  
Constant -3.414 0.000 
 (0.117)  
   
Observations 8,142 
Standard errors in parentheses – Logistic Regression 
Using a logit model allows us to estimate significance and directionality of our variables; 
however, it does not allow for an easy understanding of the substantive impact of variables. To 
illustrate the impact of amici briefs on the likelihood of certiorari being granted, I generate a 
predictive margins plot for the various amounts of amicus briefs filed before certiorari. I hold 
the other variables at their median (Ideological distance, Discussion in Days) or mode (S.G. 
Party to Case). Figure 4.1 illustrates these findings. 
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Figure 4.1: Probability of Certiorari being Granted – Amicus Briefs 
 
Before generating predictive margins, I removed some of the extreme outliers. Given 
99.9% of all petitions have 16 or less amicus briefs filed before certiorari, I cap the analysis at 
16.35 With the other variables held at their modal or median values, there is a 4.4% likelihood of 
a petition being granted certiorari when there are zero amicus briefs filed. The presence of three 
amici briefs almost doubles the likelihood of certiorari being granted to 8.5%. At the maximum 
number of amicus briefs filed in this subset, 16, the probability of certiorari being granted 
increases to 92.37%. The model predicts that when nine amicus briefs are filed a petition reaches 
51% probability of being granted. When examining the entire data-set with no limits to amicus 
participation, once a petition receives more than 16 amicus briefs it is virtually guaranteed to be 
granted certiorari.  
                                                 
35 Predictive margins were ran using the entire data-set, however, once a petition receives more than 16 amici briefs 
the probability of certiorari being granted increases to near 100%. Further, capping at 16 allows for a more focused 
view at what the majority of petitions receive versus illustrating the outliers.  
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These results confirm previous studies and demonstrate that cert petitions receiving more 
amicus curiae briefs are most likely to be granted certiorari. These findings also reveal why 
studying what impacts amici brief submission is a worthwhile endeavor: If public attention 
increases the likelihood of amicus briefs being filed, it suggests there is an indirect influence of 
the public on the certiorari process.  
I now test my main theoretical contention: increased public attention to an issue area will 
increase the number of amici briefs petitions related to that issue receive. The dependent variable 
for this analysis is a count of how many amici briefs each petition received; I use a negative 
binomial regression to estimate the models. Since I only have public attention data on three topic 
areas, the number of petitions for this analysis drops to 160. I control for the Ideological 
Distance between the lower court and USSCT, and whether the S.G. is a party to the case. Table 
4.3 reports the results for this model.  
The results of the negative binomial estimate show a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between public attention and the number of amicus briefs filed before a cert 
decision. Thus, as public attention to an issue area increases, the likelihood of an amicus brief 
being filed on a case in that issue area also increases. This result suggests that key legal actors 
are responding to cues sent by the public about what issues deserve attention. The only other 
variable to reach statistical significance is if the S.G. is party to the case. This result builds on 
previous work and suggests that when the S.G. is a petitioner, others take notice and file amici 
stating their desired outcome. Interestingly, again, the Ideological Distance between the U.S. 
Supreme Court and lower courts is not statistically significant.  
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Amicus curiae before Certiorari 
 Amici Before Cert p-value 
Public Attention 62.37 0.048 
 (31.49)  
Ideological Distance 0.0626 0.950 
 (1.007)  
S.G. Party to Case 0.584 0.075 
 (0.328)  
Constant -0.158 0.661 
 (0.361)  
   
Observations 160  
Standard errors in parentheses – Negative Binomial Regression 
To assess the substantive impact of public attention, I create a predicted number of events 
margins plot. The two other independent variables are held at their medians. At the lowest 
amount of public attention, the predicted number of amici briefs is less than 1. At the mean of 
public attention, the predicted number of amici briefs increases to 1.21. At the maximum amount 
of public attention, the predicted number of amicus briefs increases to 2.37. Figure 4.2 illustrates 
the spectrum of results from minimum to maximum public attention. Connecting back to the 
earlier findings in Figure 4.1, there is a substantively significant impact of public attention on 
amicus briefs being filed. The margins in Figure 4.1 illustrated that when a petition received 
roughly three amicus briefs, there was a ten percent increase in the likelihood of certiorari being 
granted over a petition with no amicus briefs. The earlier analysis in figure 4.1 suggested nine 
petitions as the so-called magic number of amicus needed for a petition to be more than 50% 
likely to be granted. While the maximum number of amicus filed with maximum public attention 
is close to four in this estimation, four can have a strong impact on if a petition will be granted 
cert. Using a larger data-set of issue areas, or different issue areas, might reveal more strength of 
public attention.  
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Figure 4.2: Predicted Events – Number of Amici Briefs & Public Attention 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter builds on previous research and finds that public interest in an issue area can 
have indirect effects on the likelihood of petitions granted certiorari via amicus curiae. I find 
that when an issue becomes highly salient to the public, interested parties will be more likely to 
file amicus curiae briefs.  I further mirror earlier studies that show petitions receiving more 
amicus briefs are more likely to be granted certiorari. Thus, this relationship between the public 
and other interested parties may indirectly increase the likelihood the Court will grant certiorari 
to petitions dealing with that salient issue area. 
This chapter examined what impact public attention has on the filing of amici briefs in 
general. Chapter 5 explores what motivates specific key actors, particularly government 
attorneys and interest groups, to petition a case to the Supreme Court and file amicus curiae 
briefs.   
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5 CHAPTER 5: IMPACT OF PUBLIC ATTENTION ON INFLUENTIAL 
ATTORNEYS AND INTEREST GROUPS 
5.1 Introduction 
Certain attorneys and interest groups who are well known in legal circles have been 
shown time and again to have an outsized impact on all levels of courts. These repeat players are 
more likely to have their petitions granted certiorari, and they are more likely to win their cases 
before the Supreme Court (Galanter 1974; Feldman and Kappner 2016). These powerful groups 
are motivated to act for several reasons. I argue that one key motivation for both public and 
private repeat players is the amount of attention the public pays to a specific issue.  
On October 9th, 2015, California enacted the Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, 
Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the “Act”). A key element of the Act required all 
licensed pregnancy clinics within California to disclose information to patients about available 
family planning services offered by the state and private providers, including abortion and 
contraceptive options. The Act was set to begin enforcement on January 1st, 2016. On October 
13th, 2015, the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) and two other 
religiously affiliated groups who provided pregnancy services sued, attempting to block 
implementation of the new law. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement of the law to force all 
licensed pregnancy assistance entities, including religious ones, to disclose information regarding 
abortion and contraceptives violated their free speech and free exercise rights.  
In February 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied 
the plaintiffs request for an injunction, finding they were unable to show a likelihood of success 
on their free speech or free exercise claims as required by previous precedent. Further, the Court 
found the Act is a neutral law of general applicability which survived rational basis review. In 
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short, the Court sided against the plaintiffs. On October 14th, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals unanimously affirmed the District Court’s decision. On March 20th, 2017, NIFLA and 
the other religious groups filed a petition for a writ of certiorari at the U.S. Supreme Court to 
overturn the earlier decisions. Within one month of filing the petition, seven interest groups 
submitted amicus curiae. It is relatively rare for a petition to receive an amicus brief at all and 
receiving seven briefs before a cert decision places it in the 96th percentile of all petitions who 
have received a at least one brief.  
The Supreme Court deliberated the petition for 160 days and ultimately granted 
certiorari. The Supreme Court received many amicus briefs, the lower court was ideologically 
distant, and state A.G.s became involved – all known cues the Court is known to look for. Once 
the decision to grant cert was made, the petition received 46 additional amicus curiae from an 
array of outside actors including members of congress, state A.G.s, other interest groups, and 
concerned citizens. In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, finding 
that the California Act violated religious pregnancy centers First Amendment rights.36 Outside 
participation in this case was vibrant, and I argue it can partially be explained by public attention.  
Reviewing the data regarding public attention over this period reveals that abortion as a 
topic reached its highest amounts of public discussion in 2016 and 2017. Figure below illustrates 
the amount of public attention abortion received from 2010 through 2017. Beginning in the final 
months of 2016 the public began discussing abortion at much higher rates, with a peak occurring 
in the first quarter of 2017.  
                                                 
36  Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, (June 26, 2018) 
59 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Public Attention to Abortion 
 
Public attention to this issue was high, and I argue outside actors were aware of the 
public discussion. A majority of amicus briefs filed in Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. 
Becerra (2018) discussed above were from other pro-life interest groups or states (Texas) who 
supported the petitioners. Participation from outside groups was generally high during this period 
in petitions relating to abortion, with not all petitions being granted cert even with many markers 
that generally predict a petition will be accepted.  
Another abortion related petition during the same time period out of Arkansas. In 2017, 
Arkansas enacted four laws which aimed to make getting an abortion more difficult, outlawing 
certain abortion techniques, and restricting certain age groups from seeking an abortion.37 Not 
long after passage of these anti-abortion laws, legal challenges arose. In Planned Parenthood v. 
Jegley (2018), a medical doctor alleged the new restrictions were not constitutional and won a 
stay in the federal district court. The state appealed to the Eighth Circuit, and attorneys general 
                                                 
37 Arkansas 2017 house bills 1032, 1434, 2024, and 1566.  
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from 15 (largely liberal) states and Washington, D.C., filed a joint amicus brief in support of the 
physician challenging the new Arkansas abortion laws.38 In the amicus brief, the attorneys 
general argued the new Arkansas laws unconstitutionally created an undue burden to terminate a 
pregnancy, increased health risks, and increased cost. On appeal, the Circuit reversed and 
remanded the lower court’s decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.    
Much like the case discussed earlier out of California, public attention was high, and 
outside actors likely saw a notable increase in public attention during litigation.39 Interest groups 
supported the physician challenging the law, and a strong contingent of 15 state attorneys general 
became involved. The states represented in the amicus brief include New York, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and the District of Columbia; liberal states in 
which attorneys general are incentivized to pursue litigation that appeals to their constituents. 
Further, once the appeal reached the Supreme Court, there were two amicus briefs filed before a 
certiorari decision.40 While certiorari was ultimately not granted, it is important to review 
petitions such as this. Many state attorneys and outside groups took notice and attempted to 
change policy through this litigation. While ultimately unsuccessful, the public may have helped 
spur extra participation that otherwise may not have occurred.   
Some Attorneys General advertise their legal pursuits, much like Attorney General Eric 
T. Schneiderman of New York. In a statement on the Attorney General’s website, Schneiderman 
listed a full-throated defense of why he is directing his office to spend valuable time fighting 
                                                 
38 Brief Amicus curiae from the Attorneys General of New York, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and the 
District of Columbia.  
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/States%20Amicus%20Brief%20STAMPED.pdf 
39 From June 2016 (when Arkansas and other states enacted tougher abortion laws) through June 2017, the amount 
of public attention paid to the abortion issue area more than doubled.  
40 https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-935.html 
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against the Arkansas legislation, along with many other challenges to women’s reproductive 
rights across the country. Schneiderman argues in a press release, “[W]e’re seeing a proliferation 
of laws that seek to eliminate safe, medically-accepted accepted methods of abortion. We will 
not stand by while women’s health and constitutional rights are jeopardized by extremist laws.”41 
Many government attorneys make public statements such as these, likely to ingratiate themselves 
with their constituencies.  
In the previous chapter, I argue heightened public attention to certain issue areas 
increases the likelihood of amicus curiae briefs being filed alongside petitions related to these 
salient issues. In this chapter, I argue powerful litigants, such as solicitors general, attorneys 
general, private repeat players, and interest groups are similarly more likely to submit an amici 
brief, and more likely to appeal their case to the U.S. Supreme Court, when the case in question 
relates to issues of high public salience. Public attention and outcry can influence powerful 
actors to engage a problem they may not have otherwise. This chapter proceeds as follows: I first 
explicate why these repeat players are likely to be influenced by heightened public attention to 
an issue, and why they may respond to this public interest by joining a petition for certiorari on 
related cases. I also distinguish between the motivations of government attorneys as opposed to 
private repeat players. I then outline how I test this theory of elite attorney action and report the 
results of my empirical tests.  
5.2 Federal Attorneys 
The Solicitor General (S.G.) may be the most important outside actor that appears in front 
of the U.S. Supreme Court. The strength of the S.G. is clearly established: when the S.G. 
                                                 
41 A.G. Schneiderman Leads Amicus Brief Defending Women's Access To Constitutionally-Protected Abortion 
Services 
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-leads-amicus-brief-defending-womens-access-constitutionally-
protected 
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petitions the Court for certiorari, the Court is much more likely to accept that case for review 
(Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Provine 1980; Ulmer 1984; Caldeira and Wright 1988; McGuire 1998; 
Owens 2010). Once the Solicitor General has made the government’s position clear, the Court 
sides with the government most of the time at the merits stage (McGuire 1998; Owens 2010). 
The influence of the S.G. crosses ideological boundaries: When the two branches are 
ideologically aligned, the S.G. wins 87% of the time on the merits, and that number is still as 
high as 60% even when they are not ideologically close (Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005; 
Wohlfarth 2009). Given that the U.S. Supreme Court accepts less than 1% of all petitions it 
reviews, the impact of the S.G. getting her petitions granted and decided (most of the time) in her 
favor cannot be over stated. 
The S.G. can generally be viewed as a proxy for the president and executive branch’s 
preferences (Johnson 2003; Nicholson and Collins 2008; Owens 2010; Rogol 2018). Due to the 
president’s electoral and policy goals, the executive branch and S.G. are obviously aware when 
an issue becomes highly important to the public. The S.G. may be encouraged to file a brief for 
political reasons stating the position of the executive branch (Supreme Court Rule 37.4). The 
S.G. is more likely to file a brief or become more active in litigation if the case/issue is important 
to the public (Puro 1971; Salokar 1992). Nicholson and Collins (2008) investigate what legal, 
political, and administrative conditions may prompt the S.G. to file an amicus curiae brief. 
Central to this discussion, they find that when cases are salient, as measured via the New York 
Times salience measure (Epstein and Segal 2000), the S.G. is 15% more likely to file a brief 
(Nicholson and Collins 2008). However, this salience measure, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
captures a post hoc determination of case salience. Their findings do not therefore distinguish 
between whether the case was salient at the time the S.G. decided to file the brief, or, 
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alternatively, whether the S.G. filing the brief contributed to its increased salience at the time the 
decision was handed down. Thus, I similarly hypothesize that the S.G. is more likely to submit 
an amicus brief or join a petition when the issue garners more attention from the public, and 
these actions have an outsized impact in increasing the likelihood of certiorari being granted for 
that petition. I expand on their analysis, however, by exploring whether public attention to an 
issue at the time the S.G. is deciding whether to get involved influences the S.G.’s decision 
making. Previous work has demonstrated the impact of the S.G. on Supreme Court agenda 
setting and decision making. My expansion further fills in what prompts the S.G. to take action 
on certain cases.  
5.3 State Attorneys 
Like other elected officials in the states, State Attorneys General or Solicitors General 
also have a keen interest in litigating cases the public cares about and is paying attention to 
(Brace et al. 2002; Erikson, Wright, and Mclver 1993; Jacoby and Schneider 2001; Provost 
2010). For example, on the “role of the Solicitor General” page of the Florida S.G.’s website, 
one key part of the responsibilities of the job include pursuing “matter[s] of great public 
interest.”42 And, beyond the general belief in supporting the public interest, state A.G.s are also 
influenced by personal electoral concerns: In 43 of the fifty states, state Attorneys General are 
elected, giving an electoral incentive to attending to issues of public import. Catering to public 
opinion within their states is a high priority for state A.G.s as the position has often been used as 
a stepping stone for higher elected positions, including governor and U.S. Senator (Clayton 
1994; Mahtesian 1996; Provost 2003). Provost (2010, 4) argues “state AGs are driven by 
                                                 
42 Homepage of the Florida Attorney General: 
http://myfloridalegal.com/pages.nsf/main/a0cb91c5c403a0f385256cc6007a3808!opendocument 
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normative concerns of what policies are best for the state, but also by pragmatic concerns such as 
reelection and, for the more ambitious, reaching higher offices, such as governor.” In short, the 
leap from A.G. to Governor or Senator would not be possible if the public did not approve of the 
A.G.’s record. State attorneys general thus have a clear incentive to pursue cases the public cares 
about.  
Other research provides additional evidence suggesting that state A.G.s pay close 
attention to issues the public cares about. Spill, Licari, and Ray (2001) find that in states with 
higher amounts of smoking related disease and a relatively small tobacco farming industry, state 
A.G.s were more likely to file tobacco litigation early and often. If the state was a major 
producer of tobacco, however, state A.G.s took their time in joining this litigation, if they joined 
at all. Thus, I hypothesize that as public attention to issue areas increases, the likelihood of 
powerful state attorneys filing certiorari petitions, as well as amicus briefs, related to those 
salient issue areas also increases. To my knowledge, no one has expressly studied the link 
between state A.G. behavior, petitions for certiorari, and amici briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
This dissertation explores that link and demonstrates that increased public attention prompts state 
actors to become more involved in cases, both in terms of bringing cases and filing amici briefs, 
to show the public they are taking action.    
5.4 Private Attorneys & Interest Groups 
While no other individual lawyer is in front of the Court as often as the S.G., other high 
powered, elite lawyers can also influence Supreme Court agenda setting (McGuire & Caldeira 
1993). Litigants with more financial resources are more likely to have their petitions granted by 
the Court and are more likely to receive a favorable decision on the merits (Galanter 1974; 
Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 1999). These extra resources allow for litigants to hire counsel who 
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are influential on their own. These elite attorneys include former U.S. Solicitors General, state 
A.G.s, or other repeat players who are often in front of high courts. For example, elite private 
attorneys such as David Boies and Theodore Olson, former executive branch lawyers, have no 
shortage of clients who wish to retain them. Boies and Olson were on opposite sides during the 
Bush v. Gore case, and in 2009, Boies and Olson joined forces to overturn California’s 
Proposition 8. More recently, Mr. Olson served as counsel for CNN in their press credential 
argument with the Trump administration.43 These elite lawyers have their pick of what cases and 
issues they want to litigate, and I argue when public attention to an issue increases, they are more 
likely to join litigation efforts related to that issue area.  
Interest groups also carefully choose which legal cases they join. Generally, interest 
groups influence representatives with campaign contributions or by mobilizing their large base of 
support in the public (Bentley 1908). However, many interest groups also pursue legal and 
litigation strategies, including sponsoring legal cases (Cigler, Loomis, and Nownes 2015) and 
filing amicus briefs in cases of interest (Collins 2004). Interest groups need to push for specific 
policy goals to show supporters they are active in the issues’ arena and maintain membership 
(Walker 1983). Walker (1983) examines the creation and continued maintenance of interest 
groups in the 20th century. Walker finds that interest groups need a constant issue to fight for or 
against to survive. Interest groups which maintain strong allegiances with the public, especially 
in terms of monetary donations, thrive. While most interest groups in Walker’s period of study 
were founded by a wealthy patron, without continued public support, the interest group loses 
clout in achieving policy goals. Further, Walker notes that “[w]ithout the influence of the patrons 
                                                 
43Who is Ted Olson, the former Bush lawyer representing CNN and Acosta against the White House? 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/who-is-ted-olson-the-former-bush-lawyer-representing-cnn-and-acosta-
against-the-white-house 
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of political action, the flourishing system of interest groups in the United States would be much 
smaller” (Walker 1983, p. 404).  
When a petition related to an issue area an interest group is concerned with is appealed to 
the Supreme Court, the group often takes notice and decides if filing a brief is worth the cost 
(Collins 2004; Cigler, Loomis, and Nownes 2015). Filing an amicus brief is a way of signaling to 
the members of an interest group, and the public at large, that the organization is acting and 
attempting to influence policy (Wasby 1995; Collins and Martinek 2010; Zuber, Sommer, and 
Parent 2015). Interest groups can inform the justices of the harm or benefits of granting 
certiorari or what repercussions may occur at the decision stage (Collins 2004, 2008).  I argue 
that if the public is paying more attention to the interest group or its issue area, the likelihood of 
the group filing an amicus brief or petitioning the Court itself also increases.  
Interest groups can both employ powerful private attorneys to argue their case and/or use 
in house counsel. Certain interest groups (Planned Parenthood, the ACLU, the NRA, AARP, 
etc.) are themselves powerful repeat players, even without a former S.G. representing their side. 
Among non-governmental litigants, previous research finds that those who are well financed and 
employ lawyers who are repeat players in front of the Supreme Court are the most likely to have 
their petitions granted (Galanter 1974; Feldman and Kappner 2016).  
5.5 Testing when Powerful Lawyers Act 
I argue that A.G.s, S.G.s, and private repeat-players will be more likely to be a petitioner 
or file an amicus brief if that petition relates to a publicly salient issue area than those that are 
less salient. State A.G.s are motivated by a desire to please their constituents, and they also hold 
aspirations of reaching higher elected office. Federal S.G.s are motivated by similar goals. 
Federal S.G.s are part of the executive branch, and this branch wishes to be seen as active on 
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publicly important issues. Additionally, I argue interest groups are likely to be part of salient 
petitions out of a desire to tackle issues important to their members and maintain their reputation 
of being active in important litigation.  
5.5.1 Data & Dependent Variables 
I utilize the same dataset as detailed in Chapter 4 with a new dependent variable. To 
explore whether repeat players are influenced by public attention, I utilize a series of distinct 
dependent variables. I first examine how public attention impacts the likelihood of a State or 
Federal A.G./S.G. being the petitioner. My expectation is that an A.G./S.G. will be more likely to 
petition the U.S. Supreme Court if public attention increases. The first dependent variable, 
Government Attorney-Petitioner, is coded as 1 if a state A.G./S.G. or federal S.G. is the 
petitioner of the petition and 0 otherwise.   
The next model examines the link between public attention and the actions of powerful 
private lawyers in appealing cases to the Supreme Court. Repeat Player-Petitioner is coded as 1 
if a private attorney is the petitioner, and 0 otherwise. For each attorney, I count how many 
petitions they have been a party to. If an attorney has been part of 20 petitions or more over the 
2010-2017 time period, I deem them a repeat player. This scheme is similar to how Feldman and 
Kappner (2016) determine repeat players in their work on the subject. 
The final set of models investigates how public attention impacts the probability that an 
A.G./S.G. or interest group will file an amicus brief before final certiorari decisions. It is well 
documented that an increase in amicus briefs dramatically increases the likelihood the U.S. 
Supreme Court will grant certiorari (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Provine 1980; Tanenhaus et al. 
1963; Ulmer 1984). Further, amicus briefs from these government lawyers is known to influence 
the Court at the merits stage of the process as well (Owens 2010). The dependent variables in 
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this analysis capture the number of A.G.S.G. Amici and Interest Group Amici briefs filed prior to 
certiorari for each petition. For, for the A.G./S.G. model, I removed instances where the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued a Call for the Views of the Solicitor General (CVSG), a motion that 
compels the U.S. Solicitor General to file an amicus brief, in addition to petitions where the 
government was party to the case.  
To perform this analysis, I again used the data collected on all petitions related to the 
three issue areas chosen from 2010 through 2017. This data-set contains 160 petitions, including 
the name of attorneys for both parties of all the petitions.  
5.5.2 Independent Variables 
 I return to the public attention variable captured via Twitter, with the same three topic 
areas of abortion, campaign finance, and anti-trust. Again, this measure captures how much the 
public is talking about these issues on Twitter, each month, from 2010 through 2017, 
standardized by the number of Twitter users.  
As ideological distance between the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts increases, the 
likelihood the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to petitions originating from the ideologically 
distant lower court also increases (Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000; Black and Owens 2009; 
Grant, Hendrickson, and Lynch 2012). While this project is examining how the public influences 
actors known to influence the agenda, and not cert decisions, it is important to control for 
ideological distance. In the introduction to this Chapter I outlined two similar abortion cases with 
similar elements that should stand out to the justices. One, however, came from an ideologically 
distant court, whereas the other did not.  
To estimate the Ideological Distance between the Supreme Court and the lower circuits, I 
rely on the Judicial Common Space measure from Epstein et al. 2007. The Judicial Common 
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Space (J.C.S.) measure estimates the median ideological score for the Supreme Court and all 11 
circuits plus D.C. I take the absolute value of the difference between these two medians per term, 
and the resulting number is higher if the distance is farther and lower if the distance is not. This 
ideological measure is the same as the one outlined in Chapter 4, which has more information on 
its construction and range.  
5.6 Results 
The primary goal of this chapter is to examine the impact of public attention to issue 
areas on powerful lawyers’ decisions to appeal a case or file amici briefs alongside petitions 
related to those issues. Descriptive statistics of petitions related to abortion, campaign finance, 
and anti-trust are displayed in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Topic N 
Abortion 20 
 
Campaign Finance 26 
Anti-Trust 114 
Government Attorney 59 
Government Attorney-Petitioner 15 
Repeat Player 25 
Repeat Player-Petitioner 12 
Neither Repeat Player or AG/SG 76 
 
Overall, anti-trust is the most petitioned issue area followed by campaign finance and 
finally abortion. The amount per topic area is expected given how active corporations are in anti-
trust litigation, especially when compared to a major social issue like abortion or a relatively new 
issue area of public concern, campaign finance. A Solicitor General or Attorney General was a 
party in 59 of the 160 petitions, and the petitioner in 15 of these petitions. Repeat private 
attorneys were a party to a petition in 25 instances, and the petitioner in 12 of these cases. Public 
attention to these three issues ranged from hardly mentioned (0.003) to highly mentioned 
(0.0149). A decimal representation of public attention may not be intuitive, but the difference 
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between the low and high end is an order of magnitude. On the lower end of public attention 
there is relatively little conversation (less than 10,000 Tweets on the topic) whereas on the upper 
end there are millions of Tweets for that month.  
First, I estimate how public attention impacts the likelihood of Attorneys General and 
Solicitors General deciding to appeal a case to the U.S. Supreme Court. Table 5.2 provides 
estimates of the logit model. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, logit models are 
appropriate.44 The results for the model indicate a positive and significant influence of my key 
independent variable of Public Attention. The more the public pays attention to an issue, the 
more likely an A.G./S.G. will be the petitioner on a case related to this issue. Thus, when an 
issue grows in attention among the public, it is more likely that an A.G./S.G. will be part of 
appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
This result demonstrates a higher likelihood of participation from these powerful 
government attorneys when an issue is important to the public.  
Table 5.2: Public Attention & Government Attorneys 
 Government Attorney-Petitioner p-value 
   
Public Attention 173.0 0.021 
 (75.09)  
Ideological Distance -0.327 0.895 
 (2.471)  
Constant -3.361 0.000 
 (0.932)  
   
Observations 160  
Standard errors in parentheses 
Logit models determine positive and negative directions; however, the coefficients do not 
                                                 
44 For the second estimate, due to the low number of occurrences within the data, a range of estimates were used to 
determine best fit. Estimates using a Firth logistic regression with rare events, a Rare-Events model (King and Zeng 
2001), and Exact logistic regression (Leitgöb 2013) produce nearly identical results to a standard logistic model. For 
ease of interpretation, a standard logit model is used.   
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demonstrate substantive significance. To more fully explore the impact of public attention on 
A.G./S.G. involvement, I generated adjusted predictions for the independent variable of interest, 
Public Attention. Adjusted predictions specify values for each of the independent variables and 
compute the probability of the event occurring for those instances.  Therefore, I calculated the 
probability of an A.G./S.G. being the petitioner at various values of the independent variables.   
To observe the impact of Public Attention, I calculated adjusted predictions with Public 
Attention at its minimum value. Ideological distance is held at its median. Figure 5.2 illustrates 
the results. The x-axis displays various levels of public attention with 0. 000387 being the 
minimum observed value, 0. 00585 the mean, and 0.014729 the maximum. Descriptively, the 
mean demonstrates that when an A.G./S.G. is the petitioner there is more attention to the issue 
given by the public.  
 
Figure 5.2: Adjusted Predictions for Public Attention – A.G./S.G. as Petitioner 
95% two-tailed confidence intervals for the adjusted prediction is reported in brackets. 
Figure 5.2 demonstrates that as public attention to an issue area increases, the more likely 
an A.G./S.G. is the petitioner in certiorari petition. When public attention is at its lowest value, 
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there is a 0.058 probability of an A.G./S.G. being a petitioner for certiorari. At the mean, the 
likelihood increases to 0.148. At the maximum value of public attention, this likelihood increases 
to 0.44. Thus, when moving from the minimum to maximum value of public attention, there is a 
74.1% increase in the likelihood of an A.G./S.G. being the petitioning lawyer.  
This result shows a strong impact of public attention on the behavior of powerful 
government attorneys. They are much more likely to be involved in a petition, arguing the 
executive’s position (for the U.S. Solicitor General) or that of their state, if the public is widely 
discussing the issue. Further, when public attention is high, and the A.G./S.G. lose in lower 
courts, they are more likely to petition the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, versus when they 
lose in the lower court and public attention to the issue is low.  
Next, I examine how public attention impacts the likelihood of private attorneys who are 
repeat players in front of the U.S. Supreme Court to be party to a petition for certiorari. Table 
5.3 provides estimates of this logit model.  
Table 5.3: Public Attention & Private Repeat Players 
 Repeat Player Petitioner p-value 
   
Public Attention 201.3 0.003 
 (68.01)  
Ideological Distance -1.011 0.643 
 (2.185)  
Constant -2.971 0.000 
 (0.808)  
   
Observations 160  
Standard errors in parentheses 
Estimating the impact of public attention on private repeat players who are petitioners 
again demonstrates a statistically significant and positively signed result. Like the earlier 
A.G./S.G. estimates, the more attention the public pays to an issue area, the more likely a repeat 
player will petition the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.  
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To illustrate the substantive impact of the second model’s analysis, I again calculate 
adjusted predictions with Public Attention at its minimum value (0.000387) to its maximum 
values (0.012059). Supreme Court ideological distance is held at its median. Figure 5.3 displays 
the results of the adjusted predictions. When public attention to an issue area is low, the 
probability a repeat player will petition the Court for certiorari is 3.6%. At the mean, or dashed 
line in figure 2, the probability increases to 12.3%. At maximum public attention paid to an issue 
area, the probability jumps to 30.6%.  
 
Figure 5.3: Adjusted Probability for Public Attention – Repeat Player as Petitioner 
95% two-tailed confidence intervals for the adjusted prediction is reported in brackets. 
Finally, I examine how public attention impacts the likelihood of attorneys 
general/solicitors general and interest groups filing an amicus brief before a certiorari decision. 
For the first analysis examining A.G./S.G. amici filings, I exclude any petition where the 
government is a party. This exclusion reduces the number of petitions in the model to 141. The 
dependent variable is a count of the number of amicus filings made by a government attorney, 
with some petitions receiving amicus briefs from more than one A.G./S.G.  
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In the second model, the dependent variable notes if an interest group filed amicus curiae 
before certiorari is decided. The variable is also a count, ranging from 0 to 11 amicus briefs filed 
before cert. Due to the count nature of these dependent variables, a negative binomial regression 
is used.45 Table 5.4 provides results for both of these analyses.  
The first model examines if public attention and ideological distance impact the 
likelihood of an A.G./S.G. to file an amicus brief alongside a petition before certiorari is 
decided. The estimate reveals a statistically significant and positive relationship between these 
variables, with ideological distance not reaching significance. In other words, the more attention 
an issue receives from the public, the more likely an A.G./S.G. will file an amicus brief. These 
results, especially in combination with those reported in Table 5.2, suggest that the actions of 
S.G.s and A.G.s are influenced by public attention to certain issues, as opposed to other 
influences.  
Table 5.4: Public Attention & Amicus Briefs before Certiorari 
 A.G./S.G. Amici p-value Interest Group Amici p-value 
     
Public Attention 122.4 0.089 89.78 0.005 
 (71.92)  (31.85)  
Ideological Distance 2.490 0.244 -0.296 0.773 
 (2.135)  (1.026)  
Constant -2.562 0.001 -0.308 0.395 
 (0.792)  (0.362)  
     
Observations 141  160  
Standard errors in parentheses 
For substantive effects of the first model I generate adjusted predictions of the component 
terms. At the minimum amount of public attention, the probability an A.G./S.G. will file a brief 
                                                 
45A poisson goodness of fit test revealed that a poisson estimation would not be proper, and instead a negative 
binomial is appropriate.  
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is 0.19. At the mean amount of public attention, this probability increases to 0.25, and at the 
maximum value there exists an 0.89 probability.  
The second model in table 5.4 examines the same question, but the dependent variable 
changes to interest group amicus brief filings. The results reveal that this relationship echoes 
earlier findings: the more public attention an issue area receives, the more likely an interest 
group will file an amicus brief. This finding increases our understanding of interest group 
behavior and adds to existing literature which argues interest groups are interested in engaging 
with salient issues to show activity to their members (Walker 1983).  
 
Figure 5.4: Predicted Number of Amicus Briefs by Interest Groups 
 
Substantively, the interest group model’s predicted number of briefs illustrated in Figure 
5.4 highlights the potent effects of public attention. When public attention to an issue is low, less 
than one amicus brief is predicted to be filed by an interest group.  At the issue area’s average 
amount, the predicted amount of amicus briefs increases to 0.989, almost reaching 1. At one 
standard deviation higher than the mean amount of public attention, the predicted number of 
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amicus briefs increases to 1.378. At the maximum amount of public attention, the predicted 
number of amicus briefs filed before certiorari is decided increases to 1.972. Thus, as public 
attention increases, the number of amicus briefs distinct interest groups will file in conjunction 
with a petition also increases.  
5.7 Conclusion 
The results of this chapter indicate that for government attorneys and private repeat 
players, an increase in public attention to an issue area significantly increases the probability 
they will petition the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari. This chapter further finds that when an 
A.G./S.G. is not party to a petition, they are more likely to file an amicus brief if there is more 
public attention on the issue at hand. In addition, government attorneys and interest groups are 
more likely to file amicus briefs on related cases before a certiorari decision is made when 
public attention to an issue increases. Thus, the public has a demonstrable impact on important 
actors outside of the U.S. Supreme Court. Outside actors such as interest groups or elected 
attorneys have an incentive to tackle issues the public cares about, and this chapter shows that 
they do so with respect to appeals decisions at the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Previous work has argued interest groups must perform maintenance with their members 
in order to survive and be effective. I believe these findings empirically demonstrate 
maintenance in action from interest groups. Further, these findings show that, at least in some 
way, powerful government attorneys attend to their constituents in deciding which cases to be a 
part. This behavior makes intuitive sense from interest group and government actors’ point of 
view, in addition to supporting previous findings in various literatures.  
The ramifications of these findings indicate that there may be a measurable indirect 
relationship between public attention to issue areas and the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court. In 
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the next and final empirical chapter, I bring together amici briefs, powerful actors, and public 
attention to determine how all of it can influence the ultimate agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
I argue and find that public attention influences the decisions of key legal actors, and their 
actions in turn shape the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court.  
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6 CHAPTER 6: PUBLIC ATTENTION AND THE DISCUSS LIST 
6.1 Introduction 
Each year, the U.S. Supreme Court must whittle over 8,000 petitions for certiorari down 
to approximately 100 that will be granted a hearing on the merits. A crucial step in this 
winnowing process is the creation of the so-called “Discuss List.” Researchers do not know 
definitively what is or is not on the discuss list. The reason for the difficulty in positively 
identifying which petitions make the discuss list is due to no official reporting of this list from 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Over time there have been few studies which can expressly identify 
which petitions made the discuss list. Scholars have looked to docket books or papers from 
retired justices to determine which petitions made the list (Ulmer et al. 1972; Provine 1980; 
Caldeira and Wright 1990). For instance, Caldeira and Wright (1990) examine the 1982 term and 
identify which petitions made the discuss list through notes from the docket books of Justice 
William J. Brennan Jr. Outside of docket books or notes from past justices, there is no reliable 
way to determine what exactly is on the discuss list.  
Caldeira and Wright (1990) use the docket books from Justice Brennan to examine what 
aspects of petitions increase the likelihood the Court will place them on the discuss list. 
Variables such as U.S. being a party, lower court conflict, issue area (Civil Liberties), ideology, 
and amicus curiae participation are tested. In short, the authors find that the U.S. Solicitor 
General manages to land over 90% of the cases they are a part of placed on the discuss list, and 
more amicus briefs further increase the likelihood of placement on the list.  
Notably missing from earlier work on Supreme Court agenda setting is any real measure 
of public opinion or public salience. Many scholars have attempted to account for salience and 
how it impacts decision making on the merits. However, due to the difficulty in convincingly 
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ascertaining what the public thinks about an issue at any given moment, its influence on 
certiorari has largely been unstudied.  
6.2 Granting or Denying Cert: Luck or Influence? 
Given the small proportion of petitions granted certiorari in a term, it can appear that 
one’s petition being granted is based on luck, which is how one former Supreme Court clerk 
described the agenda setting process (Perry 1991). The clerks of the Supreme Court are involved 
in the certiorari process, exerting their own influence on the justices they write memorandum 
for. Generally, one clerk in the pool drafts a memo for each petition, then, that memo is 
distributed to the other justices who participate in the pool. Some justices ask their personal 
clerks to review these memos, others skip this step, but generally the justices themselves focus 
on the memos instead of reading each petition (Perry 1991). Scholars have identified many 
aspects of a petition that “stick out” and gain the attention of the justices. Petitions that attract 
interest group support, receive amicus curiae briefs, cite a conflict among lower courts, and have 
powerful attorneys as a party are more likely to gain the attention of the Court (Caldeira and 
Wright 1988; Provine 1980; Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer 1984; Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 
2005; Wolfarth 2009; Owens 2010)..  
I argue increased public attention can also cause external actors to change their behavior, 
filing amici briefs or petitioning the Court for certiorari when they otherwise would not. The 
justices and clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court are likely not considering what is currently popular 
on social media while writing memos or deciding which petitions to grant cert. However, the 
Court needs legitimacy from the public to operate and cannot enforce decisions alone, meaning 
opinions of other government institutions and the public are likely considered (Caldeira 1986; 
Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson and Caldeira 1998; Ignagni and Meernik 1994; Bailey, 
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Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005; Hettinger and Zorn 2005; Curry, Pacelle, and Marshall 2008; Hall 
2014; Gibson and Nelson 2015). I posit that when an issue is highly salient among the public, 
this salience influences others surrounding the Court, indirectly increasing the likelihood of 
petitions related to salient issue areas being discussed longer/placed on the discuss list. With high 
public attention surrounding an issue area, government attorneys take notice and file amicus 
briefs or become counsel themselves to the petition. In addition, interest groups sponsor 
litigation or file amicus briefs to push forward their policy preference and engage in maintenance 
of their membership base.  
Either due to concerns about maintaining their legitimacy, replacement of justices, or 
wanting to tackle issues the public cares about, the Court generally tracks with public opinion at 
the merits stage. Some argue the mechanism for why the Court tends to follow public opinion at 
the merits stage is due to replacement of justices over time (Norpoth and Segal 1994; Giles, 
Blackstone and Vining 2008), or due to constraints perceived from other elected branches 
(Chutkow 2008; Harvey and Friedman 2009). The public elects the president who selects future 
justices, as well as the senators who confirm them. Thus, the installation of a new justice would 
then be reflective of public opinion at that time. Others argue public opinion produces a real 
constraint on judicial decision making at the merits stage, regardless of changes in composition 
of the justices (Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Hurwitz, 
Mishler, and Sheehan 2004; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011).  
While I argue the Court spends more time on petitions regarding a salient issue area 
because of outside actor’s influence, the Justices and their clerks are part of society. It is a 
reasonable assumption they are aware what issues are salient to the public at any given time, too 
(Caldeira and Wright 1990; Giles, Blackstone, and Vining 2008; Baum 2009; Fix 2014). Thus, 
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the combination of more amicus briefs, participation from powerful attorneys, and their own 
sense of what the public is attentive to, I argue and expect the Court will spend more time on 
petitions when the issue is salient.  
6.3 Testing Public and Supreme Court Attention 
Like other chapters in this dissertation, I rely on petition data gathered between the 2010 
through 2017 terms to test how public attention impacts the attention, or time, given to each 
petition by the U.S. Supreme Court. After gathering the petitions during my time of interest, I 
identify all cases that fall into my three topic areas of interest: abortion, anti-trust, or campaign 
finance. In total, 12,016 paid petitions are gathered with 160 petitions specifically related to the 
selected three issue areas. 
6.3.1 Capturing Increased Attention to Petitions by the Supreme Court 
Given the difficulty in knowing exactly which petitions make the discuss list, I determine 
how much time the Court spent deliberating on a petition as a proxy for attention given to a 
petition by the U.S. Supreme Court. I must first demonstrate the relationship between discussion 
time and the likelihood of certiorari being granted. To calculate the time devoted to each 
petition, I count the number of days from the date of first distribution to conference to the date 
when the petition receives a final decision. The date of first distribution marks the day in which 
the petition has cleared procedural hurdles and is given to the justices for consideration.46 On 
conclusion day, the justices announce whether the petition has been granted certiorari or denied. 
Descriptive analyses reveal that denied petitions are discussed for an average of 49 days. When 
the Court grants certiorari, however, the average number of discussion days jumps to 109 days.  
                                                 
46 Another potential starting date could be the date of filing for each petition. However, the Court will at times take a 
recess, and those petitions stagnate during this break. Thus, using the date of distribution gives a more reliable 
measure of how long each petition was being discussed.  
82 
To more systematically establish that Days Discussed provides a reasonable proxy for 
petitions that received increased attention from the Court during the certiorari process, I estimate 
the factors that influence the likelihood of a petition being granted certiorari. I control for other 
variables known to influence certiorari outcomes, such as the ideological distance between the 
USSCT and the lower court, the number of amicus briefs, and Solicitor General involvement; 
these variables are all measured in the same manner as explained in previous chapters.  
The dependent variable in this initial analysis, Certiorari Granted, is dichotomous, coded 
as one (1) if the petition was granted certiorari, and zero (0) if denied. Due to the dichotomous 
nature of the dependent variable, a logistic estimation is appropriate. I expect all independent 
variables to be positive and significant, reinforcing past work. Days Discussed should also be 
positive and significant, indicating more attention from the Court results in a higher likelihood of 
a petition being granted. The results are reported in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1: Determinants of Certiorari 
VARIABLES Certiorari Granted p-value 
   
Ideological Distance 0.482 0.109 
 (0.311)  
Amicus curiae  0.347 0.000 
 (0.025)  
Days Discussed 0.007 0.000 
 (0.0005)  
A.G./S.G. Petitioner 1.556 0.000 
 (0.193)  
Constant -3.409 0.000 
 (0.116)  
   
Observations 8,142  
Standard errors in parentheses 
The results from this estimation has some interesting findings. First, past findings noting 
the impact of amicus briefs and powerful government attorneys holds, with both variables 
showing a positive and statistically significant influence on the outcome of a petition. 
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Surprisingly, the ideological distance between the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower court is not 
significant.  
Days Discussed is positive and significant, however, indicating that the more time the 
justices spend deliberating a petition, the more likely they are to ultimately grant certiorari. To 
demonstrate the substantive impact of the Days Discussed variable, I generate predictive margins 
at a number of points with the other variables held at their mean or median when appropriate. 
Figure 1 illustrates the results. 
 
Figure 6.1: Likelihood of Petition Granted Certiorari 
 
When a petition is discussed for the minimum amount of days (one), the probability of 
certiorari being granted is 4.3%. At the mean amount for denied petitions, 49 days (the dashed 
line), the probability is 5.2%. When discussed for the average amount of days of granted 
petitions, or 109 days (the solid line), the probability rises to 9.8% - a near 100% increase in 
probability. At the maximum amount of days discussed, the likelihood of certiorari being 
granted jumps to 82%. It should be noted, however, that it is exceedingly rare for a petition to be 
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discussed less than 18 days or more than 150 days, as 95% of all petitions are discussed within 
an 18 to 150-day window.   
These results suggest that Days Discussed provides a reasonable proxy for which cases 
receive more attention from the Court; further, those petitions receiving more attention are 
significantly more likely to be granted certiorari. Given how few cases are ultimately granted 
certiorari, distinguishing how long a petition was under advisement provides some signals as to 
the “cert-worthiness” of the petition. Those that are discussed for a greater period of time have a 
greater likelihood of being granted; those that are considered for only a short period of time are 
much more likely to have not even made it on to the discuss list and instead been routinely 
dismissed. With this connection between discussion days and certiorari established, we now 
move to the main analysis of this chapter: investigating whether and to what degree public 
attention indirectly influences the Court’s certiorari process.  
6.4 Heckman Selection Model 
To test my argument that public attention indirectly influences the agenda of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, I use a two-stage Heckman (1979) selection model. A Heckman selection model 
captures my theoretical arguments appropriately, and is an excellent estimator given the 
truncated nature of my data (petitions related to the three topic areas) in the first stage. Here, 
previous studies, as well as results presented in Chapter 4 and 5, show that more amici briefs and 
the presence of powerful attorneys increase the likelihood of certiorari being granted. However, 
most analyses of certiorari decision-making skip over the question of what distinguishes 
petitions that receive more amici filings or garner powerful attorneys. I argue – and show in 
previous chapters – that public attention influences whether actors appeal certain petitions, and 
whether they choose to file amici briefs. I further posit that these strategic litigation decisions 
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subsequently influence which cases receive increased attention from the Court during the 
certiorari process, thereby highlighting an indirect mechanism through which public attention 
helps crafts the Court’s agenda. Thus, a Heckman two-stage model captures the dual phases this 
theory proposes: it first takes into account the public’s influence on amici filings, interest groups, 
and powerful lawyers, and then accounts for how those variables influence the length of time the 
Court spends deliberating each petition.  
When running a Heckman selection model, there are two dependent variables, one for 
each stage. To account for the impact public attention has on powerful actors both in petitioning 
the Court and filing amicus briefs, I run two separate Heckman models; one for each variable 
shown to have an impact on the length of time the Court deliberates a petition. The first stage of 
both models estimates the impact public attention has on the two dependent variables in 
question. One estimates the number of amici briefs filed before certiorari is decided and the 
other estimates if a state or federal A.G./S.G. or repeat player is the petitioner. I combine 
government lawyers and private repeat players due to a low number of petitions with a 
government lawyer as petitioner and high public attention. The second dependent variable for all 
three models is Days Discussed.  
6.4.1 Independent Variables included in Heckman selection model 
The primary independent variable of interest is my measure of public attention to 
abortion, campaign finance, and anti-trust. I argue this is a latent variable which influences 
outside actors to file an amicus brief or petition the Court for certiorari. I do not expect, nor do I 
find, public attention to directly influence how long the justices spend deliberating a petition. 
However, I do expect and find that public attention increases the likelihood of others taking 
action, which in turn affects the discussion-time dependent variable. Thus, public attention 
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illuminates how public mediates the actions of important actors surrounding the Court, and how 
those actions in turn help craft the Court’s agenda.  
The remaining variables include the ideological distance between the Supreme Court and 
circuit courts, if an A.G./S.G. was the petitioner, and if the U.S. Solicitor General or state A.G. 
file an amicus brief before certiorari. I include ideological distance and in both stages of the 
model. The variables for U.S. Solicitor General filing an amicus brief and state A.G./S.G. amici 
briefs are included in only the second stage for empirical and theoretical reasons. There must be 
differentiation between the independent variables in both stages, and, using an independent 
variable such as USSG amici filings before certiorari to then predict amici filings before cert is 
inappropriate as it would be predicting the same thing.  
6.5 Results 
Table 6.2 reports the results of the first Heckman selection model testing the impact of 
public attention on amicus filings before certiorari is decided. Overall, the model performs well 
with a significant result for both the chi squared and likelihood ratio tests. The results support my 
argument of an indirect impact of public attention on discussion days. When the amount of 
Public Attention an issue area receives increases, outside actors are more likely to file amicus 
briefs on petitions related to that issue before certiorari, and the Court is then subsequently likely 
to spend more days discussing those petitions. Similar to Scott’s (2006) findings, and mirroring 
the results shown in Table 6.1, ideological distance between the Supreme Court and lower Courts 
is insignificant. In the second stage, only amicus briefs filed by state or federal attorneys general 
or solicitors general have an impact on the amount of time the Court spends deliberating a 
petition. 
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Table 6.2: Indirect Impact of Public Attention on Days Discussed; Amici Briefs 
 2nd Stage 
Days Discussed 
 
p-value 
1st Stage 
# Amici before Cert 
 
p-value 
     
Ideological Distance 13.68 0.817 -0.066 0.928 
 (59.22)  (0.726)  
A.G./S.G. Petitioner 33.21 0.211 0.568 0.267 
 (26.56)  (0.511)  
USSG Amici 156.3 0.000   
 (32.98)    
State A.G./S.G. Amici -19.54 0.008   
 (7.375)    
Public Attention   82.34 0.004 
   (28.43)  
Constant 69.25 0.015 -0.235  
 (28.51)  (0.262)  
     
Observations 160  160  
Prob > χ2 = 0.0001     
Heckman Two-Stage Selection model - Standard errors in parentheses 
 
The next estimation is similar to the above, but instead of selecting on amicus briefs and 
public attention, I select on if an influential repeat player (both government attorney and/or a 
private repeat player) are the petitioner. Table 6.3 reports the results of this estimation; however, 
the overall model statistics are not as positive as the amicus brief model as the chi squared 
estimation is 0.4025. Even with a low p-value, likely due to the small sample size, there is likely 
connection between public attention, powerful lawyers, and discussion days if the N increased. 
The results in Table 6.3 are again in line with expectations and show a demonstrable influence of 
public attention on powerful litigants, if not a strongly significant one. The more public attention 
an issue area receives, the more likely a state or federal A.G./S.G. or private repeat player will 
petition the Supreme Court with a case related to that salient issue area.  
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Table 6.3: Indirect Impact of Public Attention on Days Discussed; Repeat Players 
 2nd Stage 
Days Discussed 
 
p-value 
1st Stage 
Repeat-Player Petitioner 
 
p-value 
     
Ideological Distance 127.8 0.219 -1.216 0.2 
 (104.0)  (0.949)  
# Amici Before Cert -3.953 0.522   
 (6.168)    
Public Attention   180.1 0.000 
   (31.18)  
Constant 14.79 0.769 -1.149 0.000 
 (50.31)  (0.326)  
     
Observations 160  160  
Prob > χ2 = 0. 4025     
Heckman Two-Stage Selection model - Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Taken together, these results demonstrate that public attention is a latent variable 
influencing the decisions of powerful actors outside of the Court. The more the public talks about 
an issue area, the more likely the Court will receive amicus briefs alongside petitions related to 
that issue area. And, the powerful litigants (such as the A.G./S.G.) that we know have an 
outsized impact are more likely to be the petitioner of a case pertaining to issue areas attracting 
public attention.  
The reason outside actors are likely to take action is clear: government attorneys have an 
electoral incentive, either through their own election (in the states) or due to a desire to tackle 
popular issues from the executive branch (federal). Further, interest groups who wish to see 
policy implemented in a specific manner, and must also engage in essential group maintenance, 
are incentivized to prepare amicus briefs or retain a well-known private attorney to litigate a case 
when the public is paying more attention to an issue area within their arena. This activity from 
interest groups shows its members that the interest group is taking action, and because of the 
influence of amici briefs and well-known attorneys at both the certiorari and merits stages, it is a 
meaningful way to influence policy at the national level. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
Public attention is a latent variable affecting which petitions receive more attention from 
the Court because of the actions taken by outside actors. The number of amici briefs filed before 
cert and the presence of a government attorney as a petitioner both increase the likelihood of a 
petition being granted. Further, the number of days spent discussing a petition also positively 
increases the likelihood of certiorari being granted, suggesting the Court spends more time on 
these petitions, perhaps even placing them on the discuss list. The number of days a petition is 
discussed is an important variable and given results here, it could be useful for future research in 
this topic area. While the final cert decision is not a focus here, others who are studying what 
goes into the Court’s cert decisions could find Days Discussed of value.  
The data demonstrates the relationship between days discussed and the likelihood of 
certiorari being granted, including which variables affect a petition’s ability to garner more 
attention, or days, from the Court. Two two-stage models uncover a potential latent influence of 
public attention on the important days discussed variable. I find that public attention has a 
positive and significant influence on the number of amicus briefs filed before certiorari, and 
those briefs then positively influence the number of days discussed. I find that the same holds for 
powerful actors such as state or federal attorneys general or solicitors general. The impact of the 
public on repeat players also exits, although I was not able to achieve significance in this 
estimation. The more public attention an issue area receives, the more likely one of these 
powerful litigants will petition the Supreme Court to hear a case related to the issue area. The 
reason for outside actors to act relies largely on their electoral or membership incentives to do so. 
Government attorneys want to handle cases related to issues the public is widely discussing, and 
interest groups wish to show their members they are working to influence policy.  
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In the next and final chapter, I review the work done throughout this dissertation and note 
potential expansions of this line of research along with some limitations. The concluding chapter 
summarizes my findings and discusses their broader implications.  
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7 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Overall Findings and Implications 
 This project began by asking a simple question: does the public influence the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s agenda? In answering this question, I created new measures, scraped thousands 
of petitions, and put forward new theories to explain why I thought the public had an impact. 
This project is expanding on decades of research demonstrating the positive impact amicus briefs 
and powerful litigants have on the likelihood of a petition receiving more attention from the 
Court or being granted certiorari. By using a new measure of public attention, I show that these 
powerful outside actors are themselves influenced by the public, and thus, indirectly, the public 
has an impact on the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court. Understanding the relationship between 
the public and the courts outside actors, a view of American democracy becomes clearer, and 
with the increasing ubiquity of social media, the new mechanism by which the public can make 
their concerns known, understanding this important relationship becomes paramount. 
 In this concluding chapter I first highlight how the data gathered for this project was 
collected. I hope that in explaining my methods, it might encourage others to try their hand at 
coding and looking outside what they are comfortable with to tackle new research ideas. I then 
review my theory, findings, and outline future work.  
Throughout this dissertation, I argue increased public attention to an issue can alter the 
behavior of influential actors surrounding the U.S. Supreme Court. In Chapter 2, I detailed my 
theory. I argued that powerful litigants and interest groups have a vested interest in tackling 
issues the public cares about. Powerful government attorneys often have electoral reasons for 
engaging in litigation their constituents care about, and interest groups must maintain themselves 
by being active in policy formation. Thus, powerful litigants such as the solicitor general, 
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attorneys general, private repeat players, and interest groups are more likely to submit an amici 
brief, and more likely to appeal their case to the U.S. Supreme Court public attention for a 
petitions issue is high. Public attention influences powerful actors to engage a problem they may 
have otherwise not. 
In Chapter 3 I argued that a new measure to is needed to accurately gauge what the public 
is talking about. In the past, surveys or newspaper data-sets were used in an attempt to get at 
what is important to the public. In the last ten years there has been a technological renaissance, 
dramatically altering how people communicate. Every technological advancement changes how 
the public debates with itself. From town squares to the written word and most recently radio and 
television, we constantly invent new, faster ways to communicate. With social media being the 
prominent method of discussion today, I argue it is the most appropriate place to harvest 
information about the public conversation. This chapter argued that the pervasiveness of social 
media means that conversations online are not a sample of the public’s conversation, but the 
actual, entire conversation. Thus, capturing what the public is talking about online is capturing 
what the public is talking about overall. 
In chapter 4, I explicitly tested how public attention influences the likelihood of outside 
actors to file amicus briefs. I find that when public attention surrounding an issue increases, more 
amicus curiae briefs are filed before a certiorari decision is decided. In addition, influential 
attorneys and interest groups are more likely to file a brief or be party to the petition when public 
attention is high. Specifically, when public attention is low, there is a low probability that a 
petition related to that issue will receive an amicus brief. However, when public attention 
increases, the probability also increases. Overall, I find that a petition dealing with a highly 
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talked about issue area can expect to receive four or more amicus briefs – a healthy and 
substantial amount. 
This project also contributes to our understanding of what prompts powerful attorneys 
and interest groups to act. Chapter 5 empirically tested how public attention influences these 
organizations and individuals. When public attention increases, the likelihood powerful attorneys 
or interest groups will petition the Court or write amicus briefs increases. The public has a 
demonstrable effect on important actors outside of the U.S. Supreme Court. Outside actors such 
as interest groups or elected attorneys have an interest in tackling issues the public cares about, 
and this chapter shows there is an effect of public attention.  
The final empirical chapter brought together both S.G. involvement and amicus briefs 
with public attention to examine how much attention the Court gives each petition before 
deciding its fate. I use time spent deliberating each petition as a variable to quantify how much 
attention the Court gives each petition. I find that in general, the more attention (time spent) the 
Court gives a petition, the higher the likelihood they will grant certiorari. This chapter uses a 
two-stage model to show that as public attention increases, both amicus briefs and government 
attorney involvement also increase, which then leads to more attention paid by the justices. Thus, 
there is an indirect influence of public attention on the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
For decades scholars have known that amicus briefs and government attorney 
participation positively influence the likelihood a petition will be granted certiorari. However, 
few have explicitly studied what influences the actors to act. Overall, this project finds that 
another influence exists that can encourage powerful entities and offices in the legal world to 
take action: public attention. The findings throughout this dissertation have shown an indirect 
influence from what the public is talking about and how important actors surrounding the Court 
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behave. If the public is particularly attentive to an issue, we should expect petitions related to 
that issue to receive more amicus briefs, more engagement from top lawyers, and more time in 
deliberation in conference. If public law scholars care to understand how interest groups and 
attorneys such as the Solicitor General are influenced to take action, this project should be a 
helpful entry into the literature.  
Less specifically, this dissertation shows that there are new ways to tackle old questions 
to produce new research. Knowing that public attention influences some of the most elite, most 
powerful actors in our government is an interesting finding. While it makes intuitive sense that 
the public should, of course, impact people that they elect or donate money to, that has been 
historically difficult to show empirically. Many argue that the powerful in the halls of 
government are relatively immune from public undulation, but this research should give pause to 
that line of thinking. There is now strong theoretical and empirical reason to expect the public’s 
attention to drive political and judicial action.   
While I was not able to gather more than three topic areas for this project, collecting 
more, similar data and applying it to new questions will open a large area of research. I believe if 
one were to obtain more data about what the public is talking about in specific issue area 
categories, the methods used here can greatly expand our understanding in many different areas 
of political science or any discipline that has an interest in what the public is concerned with. 
Potentially even create predictive models well ahead of the decision of the Court to grant cert. 
Where past research has always been post-facto, future research and data with predictive 
capability has nearly limitless potential to increase our understanding. 
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7.2 Future Work 
 Future projects related to certiorari can build on this work by expanding the number of 
issue areas with public conversation amounts. Given the universe of petitions is readily available 
via web scraping, gathering as many issue areas as possible would give a better picture of how 
influential the public is to outside actors, and ultimately the Court  
 Scholars from many different disciplines can use the methods outlined here to help test 
new theories. While this project focuses on the actors surrounding the agenda-setting process of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the same data can be put toward a multitude of other areas. Knowing 
how much the public is paying attention to an issue area can be used to examine how the public 
impacts the other institutions of government. Does public attention have an impact on when and 
what type of legislation is introduced, in executive order creation, or in voting patterns of 
members of Congress? Additionally, exporting the methods used here and applying them to the 
states or to other countries would produce a treasure of interesting research. Finding if these 
results hold up in the states where judges are elected or in countries with entirely different 
institutional designs. Data from social media can be tagged to specific locations and doing so 
would even enable researchers to determine how public attention impacts local institutions, 
politics, and elections.  
 In closing, the findings presented here are more than changes in probability of an amicus 
brief being filed or predicting if the S.G. will become involved in a petition. Much of public law, 
and political science in general teaches that the Court is a special institution, insulated from 
public opinion. This insulation allows the Court, in theory, to make decisions that are right and 
not necessarily popular. Indeed, our undergraduate textbooks read “Because Judges are unelected 
and serve for life, they are not accountable to the people in the same way that presidents and 
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members of Congress are” (Geer, Schiller, Segal, and Glencross 2013, p. 514) and “The 
powerful role of the courts in a democracy will always be vexing for a simple reason: the courts 
are designed to serve as a check, ultimately, on ‘We, the People’” (Morone and Kersh 2013, p. 
605).  Yes, the Court is relatively insulated, but the public may have more of an impact than we 
previously thought on the judicial branch, and, on many different facets of our republic.  
 With social media as a method of communication beginning to mature and the 
accessibility of powerful programing techniques, there are new and exciting tools available to 
scholars. Previously it would have been near impossible to gauge what the public was talking 
about in real time, or, being able to gather the universe of Supreme Court petitions in a 
reasonable amount of time. It is my hope that future work will continue this type of outside the 
box data collection and using it to help all of us more fully understand how our world works, and 
how it is changing. I believe this dissertation is an important step in showcasing how new 
methods can illuminate old questions.  
 
 
 
 
  
97 
REFERENCES 
Bailey, Michael A., Brian Kamoie, and Forrest Maltzman. 2005. "Signals from the tenth justice: 
 The political role of the solicitor general in Supreme Court decision making." American 
 Journal of Political Science 49(1): 72-85. 
Baird, Vanessa A. 2007. Answering the call of the court: How justices and litigants set the 
 Supreme Court agenda. University of Virginia Press, 2007. 
Baum, Lawrence, and Devins, Neal., 2009. Why the Supreme Court cares about elites, not the 
 American people. Geo. LJ, 98, p.1515.  
Baum, Lawrence. 2009. Judges and their audiences: A perspective on judicial behavior. 
 Princeton University Press. 
Bentley, Arthur F. 1908. The Process of Government, a Study of Social Pressures by Arthur F. 
 Bentley. The University Press. 
Black, Ryan C., and Ryan J. Owens. 2009. "Agenda setting in the Supreme Court: The collision 
 of policy and jurisprudence." The Journal of Politics 71(3): 1062-1075. 
Black, Ryan C., and Ryan J. Owens., 2012. The solicitor general and the United States Supreme 
 Court:  Executive branch influence and judicial decisions. Cambridge University Press. 
Black, Ryan C., Maron W. Sorenson, and Timothy R. Johnson. 2013. "Toward an Actor-Based 
 Measure of Supreme Court Case Salience: Information-Seeking and Engagement during 
 Oral Arguments." Political Research Quarterly 66(4): 804-818. 
Bohrnstedt, George W. 2010. "An overview of measurement in the social sciences." 
 In Presentation at the National Academy of Sciences Workshop on Advancing Social 
 Science Theory: The Importance of Common Metrics, February 24-25, Washington, D.C. 
Bond, Robert M., et al. 2012. "A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political  
 mobilization." Nature 489.7415: 295-298. 
Boucher Jr, Robert L., and Jeffrey A. Segal. 1995. "Supreme Court justices as strategic decision 
 makers: Aggressive grants and defensive denials on the Vinson court." The Journal of 
 Politics 57(3): 824-837. 
Boulianne, Shelley. 2015. "Social media use and participation: A meta-analysis of current 
 research." Information, communication & society 18(5): 524-538. 
Cardozo, Benjamin N. 2010. The nature of the judicial process. Quid Pro Books. 
Caldeira, Gregory A. 1986. "Neither the purse nor the sword: Dynamics of public confidence in 
 the Supreme Court." American Political Science Review 80(4): 1209-1226. 
Caldeira, Gregory A., and James L. Gibson. 1992. "The etiology of public support for the 
 Supreme Court." American journal of political science: 635-664. 
Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1988. "Organized interests and agenda setting in the 
 US Supreme Court." American Political Science Review 82(4): 1109-1127. 
98 
Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1990. "The discuss list: Agenda building in the 
 Supreme Court." Law and Society Review: 807-836. 
Caldeira, Gregory A., John R. Wright, and Christopher JW Zorn. 1999. "Sophisticated voting 
 and gate-keeping in the Supreme Court." Journal of Law, Economics, and 
 Organization 15(3): 549-572. 
Cameron, Charles M., Jeffrey A. Segal, and Donald Songer. 2000. "Strategic auditing in a 
 political hierarchy: An informational model of the Supreme Court's certiorari 
 decisions." American Political Science Review 94, no(1): 101-116. 
Carrubba, Clifford J., and Christopher Zorn. 2010. "Executive discretion, judicial decision 
 making, and separation of powers in the United States." The Journal of Politics 72(3): 
 812-824. 
Casillas, Christopher J., Peter K. Enns, and Patrick C. Wohlfarth. 2011. "How public opinion 
 constrains the US Supreme Court." American Journal of Political Science 55(1): 74-88. 
Cigler, Allan J., Burdett A. Loomis, and Anthony J. Nownes, eds. 2015. Interest group politics. 
 CQ Press. 
Chutkow, Dawn M. 2008. "Jurisdiction Stripping: Litigation, Ideology, and Congressional 
 Control of the Courts." The Journal of Politics 70(4): 1053-1064. 
Clark, Tom S. 2009. "Measuring ideological polarization on the united states supreme 
 court." Political Research Quarterly 62(1): 146-157. 
Clark, Tom S., Jeffrey R. Lax, and Douglas Rice. 2015. "Measuring the Political Salience of 
 Supreme Court Cases." Journal of Law and Courts 3(1): 37-65. 
Clayton, Cornell W. 1994. "Law, Politics, and the New Federalism: State as National 
 Policymakers." Review of Politics 56:525-53 
Collins, Paul M. 2004. "Friends of the court: Examining the influence of amicus curiae 
 participation in US Supreme Court litigation." Law & Society Review 38(4): 807-832. 
Collins Jr, Paul M. 2008. Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest groups and judicial decision 
 making. Oxford University Press. 
Collins, Paul M., and Wendy L. Martinek. 2010. "Friends of the circuits: Interest group influence 
 on decision making in the US courts of appeals." Social Science Quarterly 91(2): 397-
 414. 
Collins, Todd A., and Christopher A. Cooper. 2012. "Case salience and media coverage of 
 Supreme Court decisions: Toward a new measure." Political Research Quarterly 65(2): 
 396-407. 
Cook, Beverly B. 1993. "Measuring the significance of US Supreme Court decisions." The 
 Journal of Politics 55(4): 1127-1139. 
Corley, Pamela C. 2008. "The Supreme Court and Opinion Content The Influence of Parties' 
 Briefs." Political Research Quarterly 61(3): 468-478. 
99 
Curry, Brett. 2007. "Institutions, Interests, and Judicial Outcomes: The Politics of Federal 
 Diversity Jurisdiction." Political Research Quarterly 60(3): 454-467. 
Curry, Brett W., Richard L. Pacelle, and Bryan W. Marshall. 2008. “’An Informal and Limited 
 Alliance’: The President and the Supreme Court.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 38: 
 223-247. 
Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 1998. "The choices judges make." Washington, DC: 
 Congressional Quarterly. 
Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 1999. "Mapping out the strategic terrain: The informational role 
 of amici curiae." Supreme Court decision-making: New institutionalist approaches 215: 
 225-28. 
Epstein, Lee, and Jeffrey A. Segal. 2000. "Measuring issue salience." American Journal of 
 Political Science: 66-83. 
Epstein, Lee, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Chad Westerland. 2007 "The judicial 
 common space." The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 23(2): 303-325. 
Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. 1993. Statehouse democracy: Public 
 opinion and policy in the American states. Cambridge University Press. 
Feldman, Adam, and Alexander Kappner. 2016. "Finding Certainty in Cert: An Empirical 
 Analysis of the Factors Involved in Supreme Court Certiorari Decisions from 2001-
 2015." 
Fix, Michael P. 2014. “Does Deference Depend on Distinction? Issue Salience and Judicial 
 Decision Making in Administrative Law Cases.” Justice System Journal 35(2):122–138. 
Gainous, Jason, and Kevin M. Wagner. 2013. Tweeting to power: The social media revolution in 
 American politics. Oxford University Press. 
Galanter, Marc. 1974. "Why the "haves" come out ahead: Speculations on the limits of legal 
 change." Law & society review 9(1): 95-160. 
Geer, John., Wendy Schiller, Jeffrey Segal, and Dana Glencross. 2013. “Gateways to 
 Democracy: An Introduction to American Government”. Cengage Learning.  
Gibson, James L., and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1998. "Changes in the legitimacy of the European 
 Court of Justice: A post-Maastricht analysis." British Journal of Political Science: 63-91. 
Gibson, James L., and Michael J. Nelson. 2015. "Is the US Supreme Court's legitimacy grounded 
 in performance satisfaction and ideology?." American Journal of Political Science 59(1): 
 162-174. 
Gibson, Rachel K., Wainer Lusoli, and Stephen Ward. 2005. "Online participation in the UK: 
 Testing a ‘contextualised’model of Internet effects." The British Journal of Politics and 
 International Relations 7(4): 561-583. 
Giles, Micheal W., Thomas G. Walker, and Christopher Zorn. 2006. "Setting a judicial agenda: 
 The decision to grant en banc review in the US courts of appeals." Journal of 
 Politics 68(4): 852-866. 
100 
Giles, Micheal W., Bethany Blackstone, and Richard L. Vining Jr. 2008. "The Supreme Court in 
 American democracy: Unraveling the linkages between public opinion and judicial 
 decision making." The Journal of Politics 70(2): 293-306. 
Golbeck, Jennifer, Justin M. Grimes, and Anthony Rogers. 2010. "Twitter use by the US 
 Congress." Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 61, 
 no(8): 1612-1621. 
Grant, Emily, Scott A. Hendrickson, and Michael S. Lynch. 2012. "The Ideological Divide: 
 Conflict and the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decision." Clev. St. L. Rev. 60: 559. 
Hall, Matthew EK. 2014. "The Semiconstrained Court: Public Opinion, the Separation of 
 Powers, and the US Supreme Court's Fear of Nonimplementation." American Journal of 
 Political Science 58(2): 352-366. 
Hansford, Thomas G. 2004. "Information provision, organizational constraints, and the decision 
 to submit an amicus curiae brief in a US Supreme Court case." Political Research 
 Quarterly 57(2): 219-230. 
Hansford, Thomas G., and David F. Damore. 2000. "Congressional Preferences, Perceptions of 
 Threat, and Supreme Court Decision Making." American Politics Quarterly 28(4): 490-
 510. 
Harvey, Anna, and Barry Friedman. 2009. “Ducking Trouble: Congressionally Induced Selection 
 Bias in the Supreme Court's Agenda.” Journal of Politics 71(2): 574–592. 
Heckman, James. 1979. “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error.” Econometrica 47:153-
 161. 
Heffington, Colton, Brandon Beomseob Park, and Laron K. Williams. 2017. "The “Most 
 Important Problem” Dataset (MIPD): a new dataset on American issue 
 importance." Conflict Management and Peace Science: 0738894217691463. 
Hettinger, Virginia, and Christopher Zorn. 2005. “Explaining the Incidence and Timing of 
 Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 30: 
 5-28. 
Howard, Philip N., Aiden Duffy, Deen Freelon, Muzammil M. Hussain, Will Mari, and Marwa 
 Maziad. 2011. "Opening closed regimes: what was the role of social media during the 
 Arab Spring?." Available at SSRN 2595096 
Hurwitz, Mark S., William Mishler, and Reginald S. Sheehan. 2004. "‘The Influence of Public 
 Opinion on Supreme Court Decision Making, Revisited." In Annual Meeting of the 
 American Political Science Association, Chicago.  
Ignagni, Joseph, and James Meernik. 1994. “Explaining Congressional Attempts to Reverse 
 Supreme Court Decisions.” Political Research Quarterly 47: 353-372. 
Jacoby, William G., and Saundra K. Schneider. 2001. "Variability in state policy priorities: An 
 empirical analysis." The Journal of Politics 63, no(2): 544-568. 
101 
Johnson, Timothy R., 2003. The Supreme Court, the solicitor general, and the separation of 
 powers. American Politics Research, 31(4), pp.426-451. 
Kearney, Joseph D., and Thomas W. Merrill. 2000. "The influence of amicus curiae briefs on the 
 Supreme Court." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 148(3): 743-855. 
Kessler, Daniel, Thomas Meites, and Geoffrey Miller. 1996. "Explaining deviations from the 
 fifty-percent rule: A multimodal approach to the selection of cases for litigation." The 
 Journal of Legal Studies 25(1): 233-259. 
Mahtesian, Charles. 1996. "Blocked Path to the Big Job." State Government: CQs Guide to 
 Issues and Activities 1996-97, ed., Thad L. Beyle. Washington, DC: Congressional 
 Quarterly.  
Mak, Maxwell, Andrew H. Sidman, and Udi Sommer. 2013. "Is Certiorari Contingent on 
 Litigant Behavior? Petitioners' Role in Strategic Auditing." Journal of Empirical Legal 
 Studies 10(1): 54-75. 
Maltzman, Forrest, and Paul J. Wahlbeck. 1996. "Strategic policy considerations and voting 
 fluidity on the Burger Court." American Political Science Review 90(3): 581-592. 
Maltzman, Forrest, James F. Spriggs, and Paul J. Wahlbeck. 2000. Crafting law on the Supreme 
 Court: The collegial game. Cambridge University Press. 
Martinek, Wendy L. 2006. "Amici curiae in the US courts of appeals." American Politics 
 Research 34(6): 803-824. 
McAtee, Andrea, and Kevin T. McGuire. 2007. Lawyers, Justices, and Issue Salience: When and 
 How Do Legal Arguments Affect the US Supreme Court?. Law & Society Review, 41(2), 
 pp.259-278. 
McGuire, Kevin T. 1998. "Explaining executive success in the US Supreme Court." Political 
 Research Quarterly 51, no(2): 505-526. 
McGuire, Kevin T., and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1993. "Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law 
 of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court." American Political Science 
 Review 87(3): 717-726. 
McGuire, Kevin T., and James A. Stimson. 2004. "The least dangerous branch revisited: New 
 evidence on Supreme Court responsiveness to public preferences." Journal of 
 Politics 66(4): 1018-1035. 
McKay, Robert B. 1979. "ROBERT L. STERN AND EUGENE GRESSMAN: SUPREME 
 COURT PRACTICE." Western New England Law Review 1(4): 857. 
Mishler, William, and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1993. "The supreme court as a countermajoritarian 
 institution? The impact of public opinion on Supreme Court decisions." American 
 Political Science Review 87(1): 87-101. 
Morone, James., Rogan Kersh. 2013. “By the People: Debating American Government.” Oxford 
 University Press. New York, New York.  
102 
National Research Council. 2011. The Importance of Common Metrics for Advancing Social 
 Science Theory and Research: A Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National 
 Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/13034. 
Nicholson, Chris, and Paul M. Collins Jr. 2008. "The solicitor general's amicus curiae strategies 
 in the Supreme Court." American Politics Research 36(3): 382-415. 
Norpoth, Helmut and Jerey A. Segal. 1994. “Comment: Popular Influence on Supreme Court 
 Decisions.” American Political Science Review 88: 711–716. American Political Science 
 Review 88: 711–716. 
O'brien, David M. 2008. Storm center: the Supreme Court in American politics. WW Norton & 
 Company Incorporated. 
Owen, Harold James. 1971. "The role of trial courts in the local political system: a comparison of 
 two Georgia counties." PhD diss., University of Georgia. 
Owens, Ryan J. 2010. "The separation of powers and Supreme Court agenda setting." American 
 Journal of Political Science 54(2): 412-427. 
Owens, Ryan J., and David A. Simon. 2011. "Explaining the Supreme Court's Shrinking 
 Docket." Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 53: 1219. 
Pacelle Jr, Richard L., 2003. Between law and politics: The solicitor general and the structuring 
 of race, gender, and reproductive rights litigation (No. 14). Texas A&M University 
 Press. 
Perry, Barbara Ann. 1991. A Representative Supreme Court?: The Impact of Race, Religion, and 
 Gender on Appointments. Vol. 66. Praeger Pub Text. 
Priest, George L., and Benjamin Klein. 1984. "The selection of disputes for litigation." The 
 Journal of Legal Studies 13(1): 1-55. 
Provine, Doris Marie. 1980. Case Selection in the United States Supreme Court. University of 
 Chicago Press. 
Provost, Colin. 2003. "State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in 
 the New Federalism." Publius: The Journal of Federalism 33:37-53. 
Provost, Colin. 2010. "An integrated model of US state attorney general behavior in multi-state 
 litigation." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 10, no(1): 1-24. 
Puro, Steven. 1971. "The Role of the Amicus curiae in the United States Supreme Court." Ph.D. 
 dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo 
Rogol, Natalie. 2018. "Influencing the Court: Determinants of Presidential Action." Dissertation, 
 Georgia State University. 
 https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_diss/49 
Salokar, Rebecca M. 1992. The Solicitor General: The Politics of Law. Philadelphia: Temple 
 University 
103 
Scott, Kevin M. 2006. "Shaping the Supreme Court's Federal Certiorari Docket." Justice System 
 Journal 27, no 2: 191-207. 
Segal, Jeffrey A., 1997. Separation-of-powers games in the positive theory of congress and 
 courts. American Political Science Review, 91(01), pp.28-44. 
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. 2002. The Supreme Court and the attitudinal model 
 revisited. Cambridge University Press. 
Segal, Jeffrey A., Chad Westerland, and Stefanie A. Lindquist. 2011. "Congress, the Supreme 
 Court, and judicial review: Testing a constitutional separation of powers 
 model." American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 1: 89-104. 
Slotnick, Elliot E. 1978. "The chief justices and self-assignment of majority opinions: a research 
 note." Western Political Quarterly 31(2): 219-225. 
Solowiej, Lisa A., and Paul M. Collins. 2009. "Counteractive lobbying in the US Supreme 
 Court." American Politics Research 37(4): 670-699. 
Songer, Donald R., and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1992. "Who wins on appeal? Upperdogs and 
 underdogs in the United States courts of appeals." American Journal of Political 
 Science: 235-258. 
Songer, Donald R., Reginald S. Sheehan, and Susan Brodie Haire. 1999. "Do the" haves" come 
 out ahead over time? Applying Galanter's framework to decisions of the US Courts of 
 Appeals, 1925-1988." Law and Society Review: 811-832. 
Spill, Rorie L., Michael J. Licari, and Leonard Ray. 2001. "Taking on Tobacco: Policy  
 Entrepreneurship and the Tobacco Litigation." Political Research Quarterly 54:605-22 
Spriggs, James F., and Paul J. Wahlbeck. 1997. "Amicus curiae and the role of information at the 
 Supreme Court." Political Research Quarterly 50(2): 365-386. 
Stevens, John Paul. 1983. "The Life Span of a Judge-made Rule," 58 New York University Law 
 Review 1 
Stimson, James A., Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson.1995.  "Dynamic 
 representation." American Political Science Review 89(3): 543-565. 
Tanenhaus, Joseph, Marvin Schick, Matthew Muraskin, and Daniel Rosen. 1963. "The Supreme 
 Court's certiorari jurisdiction: Cue theory." Judicial decision-making 111: 127. 
Ulmer, S. Sidney. 1984. "The Supreme Court's certiorari decisions: Conflict as a predictive 
 variable." American Political Science Review 78(4): 901-911. 
Ulmer, S. Sidney, William Hintze, and Louise Kirklosky. 1972. "The decision to grant or deny 
 certiorari: Further consideration of cue theory." Law & Society Review 6(4): 637-643. 
Vining, Richard L., and Teena Wilhelm. 2010. "Explaining High‐Profile Coverage of State 
 Supreme Court Decisions." Social Science Quarterly 91(3): 704-723. 
Walker, Jack L. "The origins and maintenance of interest groups in America." 1983. American 
 Political Science Review 77, no(2): 390-406. 
104 
Wallsten, K. 2011. Beyond Agenda Setting: The Role of Political Blogs as Sources in 
 Newspaper Coverage of Government. In 2011 44th Hawaii International Conference on 
 System Sciences (HICSS) (pp. 1–10). http://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2011.80 
Wanner, Craig. 1974. "The Public Ordering of Private Relations Part One: Initiating Civil Cases 
 in Urban Trial Courts." Law & Society Review 8(3): 421-440. 
Wasby, Stephen L. 1995. Race relations litigation in an age of complexity. University of 
 Virginia Press. 
Wohlfarth, Patrick C. 2009. "The tenth justice? Consequences of politicization in the solicitor 
 general's office." The journal of politics 71(1): 224-237. 
Yates, Jeff, and Elizabeth Coggins. 2009. "The intersection of judicial attitudes and litigant 
 selection theories: explaining US Supreme Court decision-making." Wash. UJL & 
 Pol'y 29: 263. 
Zorn, Christopher JW. 2002. "US government litigation strategies in the federal appellate 
 courts." Political Research Quarterly 55(1): 145-166. 
Zuber, Katie, Udi Sommer, and Jonathan Parent. 2015. "Setting the Agenda of the United States 
 Supreme Court? Organized Interests and the Decision to File an Amicus curiae Brief at 
 Cert." Justice System Journal 36(2): 119-137. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
105 
APPENDICES  
Appendix A 
Figure A.1 illustrates the total number of amicus curiae filings per term from 2010 
through 2017. Note that 2017 is lower than average due to a number of petitions not yet decided 
when data was collected. 
Appendix A.1 
 
Figure A.1: Total Amicus Curiae filings per term 
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Appendix B 
 When estimating a model using a count dependent variable, one must first determine 
which estimator is appropriate. If the variable is normally disbursed, a Poisson model can be an 
appropriate estimator. However, when the count variable contains an excessive number of zeros, 
a determination must be made between a negative binomial or zero-inflated estimation. Both a 
negative binomial and zero-inflated handle over-dispersion of zeros in different ways. A negative 
binomial is similar to Poisson regression since it contains the same mean structure as Poisson 
regression, but it has an extra parameter to model the over-dispersion.  
A zero-inflated regression attempts to account for the extra zeros by determining which 
are zeros because they cannot be anything else, and which ones are “true” zeros. For example, 
say a researcher is interested in alcohol consumption. The researcher may collect data from 
patrons leaving a restaurant, asking each person how many drinks they consumed. In addition, 
the researcher askes each respondent how many friends they went with, their age, how many 
children were in the party, and if they drove. The count variable, number of drinks, may have an 
inflated number of zeros due to other circumstances. If the respondent was the designated driver 
or children were present, he or she might have never intended to drink alcohol. Therefore, there 
would be an over-dispersion of zeros in the data. A zero-inflated model essentially runs a 
negative binomial model, and then a logit model. The logit model is attempting to predict when 
the zeros would always be zero. Zero inflated estimations are helpful if ones data-set contains a 
variable believed to predict a zero in their count.  
In this particular situation where I am concerned with estimating the number of amicus 
briefs a petition may receive, I do not have a variable which I believe would predict a zero. 
Further, negative binomial models generally perform better when using smaller data-sets. Given 
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these considerations, and that the zero-inflated and negative binomial report similar findings, I 
selected the negative binomial. The results of the zero-inflated negative binomial with robust 
standard errors are presented in Table B.1.  
With no variable I thought could predict when a petition would receive an amicus brief, I 
inflated the constant. I did model multiple iterations with several other variables inflated, and 
Public Attention never dropped below standard levels of statistical significance.  
Appendix B.1 
Table B.1: Determinants of Amicus curiae before Certiorari 
 Amici Before Cert p-value 
Public Attention 91.507 0.001 
 (26.673)  
Ideological Distance -0.07 0.932 
 (.819)  
SG Party to Case 0.548 0.298 
 (0.527)  
Constant -0.093 0.758 
 (0.302)  
Inflate   
Constant -14.4 0.000 
 (1.78)  
Alpha Log 0.307 0.181 
 (0.231)  
Observations 160  
Prob > χ2 = 0.002   
Robust Standard errors in parentheses – Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
Prob > χ2 = 0.002 
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Appendix C 
Below are the Boolean phrases I used to collect data on the three chosen topic areas. The 
terms used are intentionally narrow as I wanted to be certain I was collecting data on these 
specific issue areas and not others. 
• Abortion: (abortion OR "pro life" OR "pro choice") place_country:us 
 
• Campaign Finance: ("Citizens United v. FEC" OR "Citizens United" OR 
"Campaign Finance" OR "Campaign Finance reform" OR "Dark money" OR 
"Money in politics" OR pac OR pacs OR "Super PAC" OR "Super PACs") 
place_country:us 
 
• Anti-trust: ("corporate monopolies" OR "antitrust" OR "anti-trust" OR "anti trust" 
OR "corporate monopoly" OR "business monopolies" OR "business monopoly") 
place_country:us 
 
 
 
 
 
 
